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A PAST AND FUTURE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: 
THE CASE OF MONTANA 
Anthony Johnstone* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Judicial elections are approaching their second century in 
the United States, and they are not going away anytime soon. 
After the rise of Jacksonian Democracy in the early nineteenth 
century, and popular calls for increased judicial independence 
from the political branches, most states hard-wired the election 
of judges into state constitutions.1 Despite reform efforts that 
emerged in the twentieth century and continue today, states that 
hold judicial elections reliably reject alternative selection 
methods. Nearly ninety percent of state judges in the United 
States are subject to election.2  
Recent deregulation of campaigns and elections through 
successful constitutional challenges now has reached judicial 
campaigns and elections. Many of the legal and ethical 
constraints on judicial campaign speech and finance, once a 
realm of electoral exceptionalism respecting the distinct office 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law. The author served as 
counsel for the State of Montana in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (as 
amicus) and American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock. Thanks to Dmitry Bam, Jean 
Bowman, Larry Howell, Greg Munro, James Nelson, James Sample and Jeff Wiltse for 
insightful comments, to Zachary Rogala and Anne Sherwood for helpful research 
assistance, and to my family for their support..  
 1. For a recent account of this history emphasizing the role of post-Jacksonian 
financial crises, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial 
Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061 (2010). 
 2. See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1077 (2007). Schotland reports that “[o]f all state judges (appellate and general-jurisdiction 
trial courts), 89% . . . face the voters in some type of election. Facing contestable elections 
are 60% . . . of our appellate judges and 80% . . . of our trial judges; facing only retention 
elections are another 26% of appellate and 9% of trial judges.” Id. at 1105. 
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of a judge, fell to these challenges alongside their political-
campaign analogues. The remaining exceptions, which protect a 
core of judicial impartiality from due process violations, are 
inconsequential to most modern judicial campaigns. These 
campaigns quickly learned the political tactics of the Citizens 
United era, prompting a flood of attack ads financed by 
independent expenditures, some of which are not fully 
disclosed.3 
Meanwhile, state courts in general, and state supreme 
courts in particular, remain important players in increasingly 
polarized debates concerning state law and politics. One-party 
state legislatures and executive branches, encouraged by 
historically large legislative margins,4 test state courts with 
contentious laws and constitutional questions. In states where a 
balance of power once encouraged political compromise, the 
losing party now may resort to litigation. The same moneyed 
interests that help set the legislative agenda also loom over state 
courts. Those judges and justices must decide the high-stakes 
and politically charged cases that follow, knowing their 
decisions may set the course for their next election campaigns. 
A moderate judge who does not line up neatly with moneyed 
interests on one side or the other risks electoral defeat. Case by 
case, issue by issue, term by term, the polarization of the 
political branches runs to the courts. 
This is the new normal in judicial elections. It follows the 
new normal in political elections of the Citizens United era. 
Judicial candidates seeking to interpret the laws are nearly as 
free to speak on legal and political issues as are the legislative 
candidates seeking to write the laws. Even in traditionally non-
 
 3. See generally Citizens United v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that the 
federal government may not suppress political speech by banning corporate expenditures 
for electioneering, but that it may require donors both to identify themselves in materials 
that they underwrite and to disclose campaign-related expenditures in excess of established 
thresholds); see also SCOTT GREYTAK ET AL., BANKROLLING THE BENCH: THE NEW 
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2013–2014 at 1 (2015) (“Over the last decade and a half, 
state Supreme Court elections have been transformed into politicized and costly contests, 
dominated by special interests seeking to shape courts to their liking.”). 
 4. See Karl Kurtz, These Unified States, STATE LEGISLATURES MAGAZINE (May 
2013) (“For the first time in more than 50 years, one party controls both chambers of the 
legislature and the governor's’ office in 37 states—Republicans in 23 states, Democrats in 
14.”). 
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partisan judicial elections, political parties may be as free to 
endorse judicial candidates as they are to endorse political 
candidates. Campaign-contribution laws limit donations to 
candidates’ campaigns, judicial or political, but face renewed 
challenges. Corporations and unions are as free to spend 
unlimited amounts of shareholder and member funds on 
independent expenditures in judicial campaigns, just as they 
may in political campaigns. Contributors are free to choose their 
preferred levels of disclosure by selecting among candidate 
campaigns, super PACs, or less transparent vehicles. Careful 
contributors may enjoy significant influence in candidate 
campaigns—judicial or political—without triggering either a 
disqualifying conflict or even the obligation to identify 
themselves. 
Montana’s 2014 election for one of two contested seats on 
the state supreme court exemplifies this new normal. In 2011, 
the Montana Supreme Court took a lonely stand against this 
state of affairs by attempting to distinguish Montana’s 
campaigns, including judicial campaigns, from the presidential  
campaign addressed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens 
United. But that principled stand was short-lived, drawing a 
quick and brief rebuke from the Supreme Court. Despite state 
concerns about financial and outside influence on judicial 
campaigns that date back a century and a half, and their 
continued relevance to judicial politics today, the Supreme 
Court so far has refused to grapple with the implications of 
Citizens United for elected judges. 
This article searches for lessons from Montana’s experience 
for the future of American judicial elections. Part II considers 
the origin of judicial elections and history of reforms in 
Montana, which is marked both by substantial worries about 
outside political intervention in state courts and by several 
innovative responses to it. Part III reviews the practice 
established by Montana’s reformed model of judicial selection 
over the past four decades. Part IV examines the Montana 
Supreme Court’s engagement with Citizens United, followed by 
a close analysis of an election held in its aftermath: the hard-
fought 2014 campaign between incumbent Justice Mike Wheat 
and challenger Lawrence VanDyke. Part V suggests some 
preliminary conclusions about the meaning of Citizens United 
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and other recent legal developments for judicial elections in the 
states, and how states might respond. 
II. A HISTORY OF MONTANA’S JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
AND JUDICIAL-ELECTION REFORMS 
Judicial selection in Montana is both distinct from and 
representative of its practice across the states. Montana’s 150-
year-old judiciary began in territorial days, when outside judges 
appointed in Washington, D.C., produced resentment among 
Montanans even as these territorial judges helped the new 
territory develop toward statehood. The state’s first constitution 
responded to this popular resentment by providing for judicial 
elections. In the Progressive Era, the state adopted typical 
campaign-finance and nonpartisan election reforms, but only 
after exceptional agonies of corporate corruption. By the second 
half of the twentieth century, Montana had joined many other 
states in reconsidering judicial elections, though it did so 
through the extraordinary means of popular deliberation through 
a constitutional convention. Montana, in short, is a microcosm 
of judicial election reform in the American states. 
A. The Territorial Origins of Montana’s Elected Judiciary 
Twenty-five years of territorial status forged Montana’s 
attitude toward its courts. In the gold rush that opened 
Montana’s territorial history, customary miners’ courts and the 
storied vigilantes dispensed civil and criminal justice.5 
Territorial justices, appointed by the President, “owed allegiance 
to the federal government and to political parties, yet at the same 
 
 5. For a sympathetic overview of customary legal institutions in the American West 
from a public-choice perspective, see Andrew P. Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes, & Cattlemen: 
Overcoming Free Rider Problems in the Private Provision of Law, 33 LAND & WATER L. 
REV. 581 (1998). See generally FREDERICK ALLEN, A DECENT ORDERLY LYNCHING: THE 
MONTANA VIGILANTES (2004). For a colorful contemporary account of the vigilantes, see 
THOMAS J. DIMSDALE, THE VIGILANTES OF MONTANA: POPULAR JUSTICE IN THE ROCKY 
MOUNTAINS (1953). Even today, the Montana Highway Patrol patch features the 
vigilantes’ mysterious warning “3-7-77,” in “a tribute to the Vigilantes, the first law 
enforcement group in the Montana Territory.” Montana Department of Justice, History of 
the Montana Highway Patrol, https://dojmt.gov/highwaypatrol/history-of-the-montana-
highway-patrol/ (2015) (indicating that the numbers were added to the patch in 1956). 
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time were not insensitive to pressures within the territory 
itself.”6 These tensions played out when Territorial Secretary 
Thomas Meagher, a Union Democrat serving as acting governor, 
pushed for statehood in 1866 with a constitutional convention 
and two extraordinary legislative sessions. When a two-member 
majority of the territorial court, both Republicans, declared the 
acts of the extraordinary sessions null and void, the state 
legislature redistricted those justices to the wilderness. Congress 
responded with a rare nullification of all laws enacted in the 
extraordinary sessions. To make clear its “irritation toward the 
Democratic populace of this ill-mannered western province,” the 
Republican Congress also revoked the legislature’s judicial 
districting power and raised the territorial judges’ salaries by 
$1000.7 
Once the territorial government settled in, “Montana gained 
recognition as having one of the most efficient court systems 
among western territories.”8 Yet territorial justices were 
“[h]ampered . . . by an unfamiliarity with mining law, and by 
resentment stemming from local political cleavages and the 
dislike of ‘foreign’ officials.”9 Despite the quality of some 
territorial justices, residents chafed at their lack of democratic 
legitimacy.10 Montanans complained about “‘breaking in’ 
pilgrim Judges from Eastern States who have known nothing of 
our people, laws and customs.”11 On the eve of the second 
Montana constitutional convention in 1884, one newspaper 
editorial captured the popular complaint that 
[t]he President has nominated another carpetbagger for 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Montana. 
Seventy-five thousand people in the Territory to make laws 
 
 6. CLARK C. SPENCE, TERRITORIAL POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN MONTANA, 
1864–89 at 212 (1975). 
 7. Id. at 43–45. 
 8. MICHAEL P. MALONE, RICHARD B. ROEDER & WILLIAM L. LANG, MONTANA: A 
HISTORY OF TWO CENTURIES 110 (1991). 
 9. SPENCE, supra note 6, at 231. 
 10. Andrew P. Morriss, Opting for Change or Continuity? Thinking About ‘Reforming’ 
the Judicial Article of Montana’s Constitution, 72 MONT. L. REV. 27, 39–40 (2011). 
 11. SPENCE, supra note 6,  at 218 (quotations omitted). 
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for themselves, and a Hoosier sent out from Indiana to tell 
us what we have done. How long, oh Lord; how long!12 
The proposed 1884 Constitution, the unsuccessful 
predecessor of the 1889 Constitution that secured statehood, 
reflected this suspicion of outside influence. In its memorial to 
Congress, the convention sought statehood to redress “the policy 
which has so long prevailed of sending strangers to rule over us 
and fill our offices.”13 The convention’s address to voters 
detailed the grievances. Notably, the address devoted more lines 
to the Judicial Department than it devoted to the legislative and 
executive branches combined. The proposed judicial system 
responded to popular distrust of outsider territorial justices: 
The present system is manifestly wrong again; by it the 
people have no voice in selecting the judges. They are sent 
to us from the far off East, probably in deference to the 
traditional idea that it was from thence all of the “wise 
men” came. . . . The character of our litigation is such that, 
however learned in the law our eastern judge may be, he 
will find himself much embarrassed in his new field.14 
Under the proposed state constitution, justices would be “elected 
by the people” for six-year terms, and would be “required to 
have resided in the State or Territory at least two years prior to 
their election.”15 
When Montana finally attained statehood in 1889, the 
convention’s address to voters16 was shorter, as the Constitution 
proposed was similar in all its fundamental provisions to the 
Constitution of 1884, which had been ratified by a large 
majority.17 Still, the judicial provisions retained primary 
importance as the only article specifically recommended in the 
address: “yet we think in this the judiciary system is better 
suited to the wants and interests of our people.”18 The 1889 
Constitution contained several stylistic and procedural changes, 
 
 12. MALONE, ROEDER & LANG, supra note 8, at 111. 
 13. MONT. CONST. of 1884 (proposed), Memorial. 
 14. Id., Address 3. 
 15. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 16. See text accompanying note 14, supra, for an excerpt from the text of the address 
accompanying the judicial article of the proposed 1884 constitution. 
 17. MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. 75. 
 18. Id. 
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but retained the elected terms and residency requirements for 
justices.19 
B. The Copper Kings and Their Influence on Montana’s 
Judicial Elections Today 
With statehood, Montana’s judiciary transitioned from 
federal appointees unfamiliar with mining law to elected 
officials all too familiar with the corporate overreach and 
corruption that came to be known as the War of the Copper 
Kings. The mining industry matured with outside investment of 
capital from the so-called Copper Kings: the 1884 and 1889 
Constitutional Convention President (and disgraced United 
States Senator) William A. Clark; the head of the giant 
Anaconda Copper Mining Company Marcus Daly; and the 
aggressive young industrialist F. Augustus Heinze. 
These larger-than-life personalities engaged in a decades-
long struggle for domination of Butte’s “richest hill on earth,”20 
and incidental to that struggle, for control of the state’s 
government—including its courts.21 The Montana Supreme 
Court once recounted the broad history of “[t]hose tumultuous 
years . . . marked by rough contests for political and economic 
domination primarily in the mining center of Butte, between 
mining and industrial enterprises controlled by foreign trusts or 
corporations.”22 Some of those rough contests played out before 
 
 19. Id., art. VIII, §§ 6–7, 10. 
 20. Larry Howell, “Purely the Creature of the Inventive Genius of the Court”: State ex 
rel. Whiteside and the Creation and Evolution of the Montana Supreme Court’s Unique 
and Controversial Writ of Supervisory Control, 69 MONT. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (explaining 
that the War of the Copper Kings occurred “at a time when the spread of electricity and 
telephones made copper one of the world’s most important natural resources”).  
 21. For the classic account, see C. B. GLASSCOCK, THE WAR OF THE COPPER KINGS 
(1935). A detailed contemporary telling is MICHAEL P. MALONE, THE BATTLE FOR BUTTE: 
MINING & POLITICS ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER, 1864–1906 (1995). The canonical story 
is summarized in MALONE, ROEDER & LANG, supra note 8, at 201–31. Scholars have 
recently reconsidered the consequences of the era for current legal questions. See Howell, 
supra note 20; Larry Howell, Once Upon a Time in the West, Citizens United, Caperton, 
and the War of the Copper Kings, 73 MONT. L. REV. 25 (2012); Jeff Wiltse, The Origins of 
Montana’s Corrupt Practices Act: A More Complete History, 73 MONT. L. REV. 299 
(2012). 
 22. W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney General 271 P.3d 1, 8 (2011), rev’d sub nom. 
Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012). 
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elected state judges, and provide a backdrop for judicial 
elections in Montana today. 
Clark and Daly feuded mainly in the political arena. In the 
1894 “Capital Fight,” Clark’s Helena bested Daly’s Anaconda to 
win the designation of state capitol.23 Clark won his 1899 United 
States Senate campaign, but resigned shortly after taking office 
when a Senate committee found evidence that he had bribed 
state legislators on a massive scale.24 Montana Attorney General 
C. B. Nolan then explained that the local grand jury would not 
indict Clark because “the people of said county felt that they 
were discharging an obligation due to the said Clark on account 
of the assistance rendered to the said county of Lewis and 
Clarke in the selection of the city of Helena as the state 
capital.”25 
The corruption didn’t stop there: Once the court accepted 
the case, Clark supporters approached all three justices with 
overtures ranging from ex parte conversations to an offer of a 
$100,000 bribe.26 The justices “did not pursue any official legal 
recourse against the persons attempting to influence them, 
deciding that exposing the effort would reflect poorly on the 
reputation of the Court.”27 They only reluctantly testified to the 
attempted bribery under subpoena from the Senate Committee 
on Privileges and Elections in its investigation of Clark’s 
election, providing important evidence in support of the 
Committee’s recommendation not to seat Senator Clark.28 
Heinze waged a more focused battle, largely in the courts, 
to extend his mining holdings in Butte and defend them against 
industry consolidation by the Amalgamated Copper Company, 
 
 23. MALONE, ROEDER & LANG, supra note 8, at 213–14. 
 24. Id. at 218–21. The bribery came before the Montana Supreme Court in disbarment 
proceedings against Clark’s lawyer and bribery bagman John B. Wellcome, during which 
the Court initially dismissed the petition because the crimes charged against Wellcome had 
not been prosecuted. See In re Wellcome, 58 P. 45, 45, 47 (1899). Election of United States 
Senators by popular vote did not become law until 1913. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII 
(providing that “[t]he Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from 
each State, elected by the people thereof”). 
 25. Wellcome, 58 P. at 49. 
 26. Howell, supra note 20, at 41. 
 27. Id. at 40. 
 28. Id. at 42–44. 
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which had purchased Daly’s Anaconda interests in 1889.29 
Heinze met mixed results as a defendant in federal court,30 and 
through a series of corporate maneuverings turned to state 
court,31 where he could more easily influence the judges. In 
1900, with his support for the re-election of William Clancy and 
the election of Edward Harney for the Second Judicial District 
Court, the state trial court with jurisdiction over Butte, Heinze 
did just that.32 For their four-year terms, “[w]ith his allies sitting 
on the local courts, Heinze could easily drive the titans of 
Standard Oil to absurd lengths” of vexatious litigation that kept 
Amalgamated—a holding company formed by Standard Oil 
officers—at bay while Heinze, sometimes literally, mined ore 
out from under the company’s feet.33 Indeed, “in a burlesque of 
judicial dignity, William Clancy found in Heinze’s favor with 
monotonous regularity.”34 
After years of delaying cases to the strategic advantage of 
Heinze, Judge Clancy dealt two devastating blows to 
Amalgamated on October 22, 1903: first, awarding ownership of 
the strategically crucial Minnie Healy mine from Amalgamated 
to Heinze; and second, enjoining the Amalgamated from holding 
its Montana subsidiaries.35 Amalgamated responded in kind, 
shutting down its Montana operations and throwing more than 
15,000 employees out of work.36 Governor Joseph Toole, 
elected in 1900 with the support of Clark and Heinze, eventually 
capitulated to Amalgamated’s demand. He called a special 
 
 29. MALONE, supra note 21, at 140, 142 (1995) (explaining that even against the liti-
gious standards of early American mining, “[w]hat happened at Butte . . . seemed to be in a 
class by itself,” a “carnival of litigation” costing thousands of jobs and tens of millions of 
dollars at the turn of the twentieth century, in large part because Heinze, who earned a rep-
utation as a “court-house miner,” employed a legal force of thirty-seven attorneys). 
 30. See, e.g., Morse v. Montana Ore-Purchasing Co., 105 F. 337, 348 (D. Mont. 1900) 
(“[U]pon the ground that there was undue influence exerted as to the jury by the 
objectionable publications [by the anti-Amalgamated Helena press], the court will grant a 
new trial.”). 
 31. MALONE, supra note 21, at 142–43. 
 32. Howell, supra note 20, at 34–41. 
 33. MALONE, ROEDER & LANG, supra note 8, at 226. 
 34. K. ROSS TOOLE, MONTANA: AN UNCOMMON LAND 199 (1959). 
 35. MALONE, supra note 21, at 173 (reporting that Judge Clancy then announced he 
would “break away to the woods tomorrow” for hunting). 
 36. Id. at 172–73. 
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session to enact an unprecedented “Fair Trials” law allowing the 
peremptory substitution of a district judge.37 
Heinze turned his attention to the Montana Supreme Court 
in 1904, reportedly offering Congressman Joseph Dixon a bribe 
to support an opponent to Chief Justice Theodore Brantly.38 
Chief Justice Brantly was then showing “unimpeachable 
integrity during . . . corrupt times” as he completed his first 
term, and would go on to become Montana’s longest-serving 
Chief Justice.39 Thus, Brantly was re-elected and Heinze’s 
Judges Clancy and Harney lost. Heinze “lost the war when he 
lost control of the courts,” and sold out to Amalgamated in 
1906.40 
Progressive opposition to the Company solidified with the 
consolidation of economic power in the Amalgamated, 
eventually completed by its purchase of Clark’s mining interests 
in 1910. Sweeping political reforms included a constitutional 
amendment providing for initiative and referendum in 1906 and 
a series of electoral reforms in 1912 including a Corrupt 
Practices Act.41 During the politically tumultuous years in 
between, the Montana legislature attempted to reform judicial 
elections by providing for non-partisan nominations. Previously 
judges ran for office like other elected officials, through 
nominations by political parties.42 In 1909 the legislature 
enacted a short law that limited judicial candidates to 
nominations by citizen petition to the exclusion of nominations 
by party convention or primary.43 Chief Justice Brantly won his 
 
 37. Id. at 177–79; see generally W. William Leaphart, First Right of Recusal, 72 
MONT. L. REV. 287, 287–89 (2011). A one-substitution variation of the law, still called the 
“Clancy Law,” remains in effect, providing that “[e]ach adverse party is entitled to one 
substitution of a district judge.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-804(1) (2015). 
 38. MALONE, ROEDER & LANG, supra note, 8 at 229. 
 39. Howell, supra note 20, at 16 n.104. 
 40. MALONE, ROEDER & LANG, supra note 8, at 229. 
 41. See Wiltse, supra note 21. 
 42. See 1895 Mont. Pol. Code §§ 1310–1320 (addressing methods of nomination, 
certification of nominees, and related subjects). 
 43.  See An Act to Provide for Non-Partisan Nominations for Judicial Offices, 1909 
MONT. LAWS 160 ch. 113 11th Leg. Assembly (Mont. 1909); see also Montana Judicial 
Branch, Brief History of the Montana Judicial Branch, http://courts.mt.gov/supreme/ 
history (characterizing the law as “a brief and largely forgotten experiment in nonpartisan 
judicial elections”) (accessed August 18, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate 
Practice and Process).  
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second reelection in the first non-partisan election held in 1910, 
though only by winning a plurality of 12,493 votes in a four-
candidate race that drew a total of 31,960—a ballot falloff of 
more than half from the 65,774 votes cast for the congressional 
seat.44 
In 1911, a Republican candidate for Butte police judge 
challenged the non-partisan election reform, and the state 
supreme court (all Republican justices) voted two-to-one to 
invalidate the law due to constitutional defects in the law’s title 
and transition process.45 In 1935, at the height of the New Deal 
and the Democratic Party’s unprecedented dominance over state 
politics,46 including a sweep of the supreme court,47 the 
legislature brought non-partisan judicial elections back for good 
with a more comprehensive reform.48 
The War of the Copper Kings left lasting scars on the 
integrity of state government in Montana, including its courts. 
Shortly after it ended, President Roosevelt’s Solicitor General 
worried about bringing the so-called smoke-wars litigation to 
end the deadly pollution of forest and farmlands by 
Amalgamated’s smelter, noting that “[t]he suit will be filed in a 
territory which has heretofore been the battleground between the 
Amalgamated and Heinze interests . . . where open confessions 
 
 44. ELLIS WALDRON, AN ATLAS OF MONTANA POLITICS SINCE 1864 at 130, 134 
(1958). When he ran as a Republican in 1904, Brantly alone garnered 30,956 votes in a 
race with little ballot falloff, perhaps due to the party labels. Id. at 108, 113 (reporting 
65,765 total votes for governor and 63,026 total votes for chief justice). “The spectacular 
drop of voter participation in the one-time nonpartisan election of 1910 and the general 
decline of voter participation in nonpartisan elections after 1932 suggest that party labels 
were important for many voters.” ELLIS WALDRON & PAUL B. WILSON, ATLAS OF 
MONTANA ELECTIONS: 1889–1976 at 289 (1978). 
 45. State ex rel. Holliday v. O’Leary, 115 P. 204 (1911). 
 46. See MALONE, ROEDER & LANG, supra note 8, at 303. 
 47. WALDRON, supra note 44, at 229, 251, 261 (explaining that all three justices were 
elected as Republicans in 1928, that two associate justices were elected as Democrats in 
1932, and that the chief justice and an associate justice were elected as Democrats in 1934). 
In an example of the effect of partisanship during this period, Associate Justice Albert H. 
Angstman, an incumbent elected as a Republican in 1928, lost to Democrat C. F. Morris in 
1934, and then won over incumbent John A. Matthews (who was elected and reelected as a 
Democrat in 1924 and 1930) in the 1936 nonpartisan election. See id. at 208, 237, 261, 272 
(discussing the elections of 1924, 1930, 1934, and 1936). 
 48. 1935 MONT. LAWS 389, ch. 182 (Mont. 24th Leg. Assembly, 1935). The Legisla-
ture had by then expanded the Supreme Court from three to five seats. See 1919 MONT. 
LAWS 86, ch. 31. 
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of sales of political and even judicial influence were lightly 
looked upon.”49 A mining trade publication observed at the time 
that “[t]he judiciary of a State has been debauched, its politics 
mired, its people obsessed, while two parties of mine owners 
have twisted our awkward mining laws to the acquirement of 
territory and the destruction of property.”50 Going forward, 
Amalgamated’s successor the Anaconda Company “dominated 
Montana after 1906 like no other single company dominated any 
other state, with the possible exception of the tiny Dupont 
satrapy of Delaware.”51 This corporate domination lasted 
decades, until a mix of political and social changes in the 1960s 
brought calls for reform, and eventually a new state constitution. 
C. A New State Constitution 
Reapportionment of the state legislature in 1965, ordered in 
the wake of the one-person one-vote revolution,52 accelerated 
the declining political influence of the Anaconda Company and 
its antagonists in the mining unions.53 In 1967 the new 
legislature commissioned a report “to determine if [the 1889 
Constitution] is adequately serving the current needs of the 
people.”54 The resulting Legislative Council Report concluded 
in 1968 that just forty-eight percent of the sections in the 1889 
Constitution were adequate in that they did not “present a major 
obstacle to effective government.”55 The Montana Supreme 
Court itself may have hastened constitutional reform. In a series 
of decisions leading up to ratification of the 1972 Constitution, 
the court voided several attempts to revise some of the more 
 
 49. DONALD MACMILLAN, SMOKE WARS: ANACONDA, COPPER, MONTANA AIR 
POLLUTION, AND THE COURTS, 1890–1920 at 173 (2000). 
 50. Id. (quoting The Amalgamated and Mr. Heinze, Mining and Scientific Press 92 
(Feb. 17, 1909)). 
 51. MALONE, supra note 21, at 210. 
 52. See Herweg v. Thirty-Ninth Leg. Assembly, 246 F. Supp. 454 (1965). 
 53. See MALONE, ROEDER & LANG, supra n. 8, at 393–94. 
 54. Mont. H. Rep. No. 17 (1967); Mont. S. Rep. No. 22 (1967). 
 55. Montana Constitutional Convention Commission, Report No. 6: Legislative 
Council Report on the Montana Constitution 1 (1971) [hereinafter Legislative Council 
Report]. 
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inflexible provisions of the 1889 Constitution.56 Professor Ellis 
Waldron concluded at this time that the Montana Supreme Court 
had been “notably ‘activist’ in its willingness to become 
involved in the processes of constitutional revision, and notably 
‘conservative’ in its view of the power of the people and their 
constituted representatives to change basic constitutional 
rules.”57 
1. A Call for a New Constitution 
The judiciary, including judicial selection, emerged as a 
central concern of constitutional reformers. In a 1967 “Blueprint 
for Modernization,” Professors David Mason and William 
Crowley proposed a comprehensive revision of the state’s 
judicial system, criticizing the 1889 judicial article as “designed 
for a horse and buggy society . . . cumbersome, inefficient and 
expensive.”58 The Blueprint’s primary focus was judicial 
administration and organization, particularly of the inferior 
courts. Yet it included an option to enact alternatives to judicial 
elections, “[i]f the legislature should see fit at some time in the 
future to adopt the Missouri Plan [of merit selection] or some 
variant thereof.”59 The Legislative Council stopped short of 
criticizing judicial elections, but noted that the method of 
judicial selection presented “a basic question,” and that the 
Missouri Plan had been recommended by the American 
Judicature Society, the American Bar Association, and the 
National Municipal League.60 
The Council also indicated that the practice of judicial 
elections in Montana resembled the policy of the Missouri Plan: 
“many judges are appointed initially and subsequent elections 
are essentially on the question of whether the judge should be 
retained,” and “appointments to fill vacancies are not usually 
 
 56. Anthony Johnstone, The Constitutional Initiative in Montana, 71 MONT. L. REV. 
325, 335–36 (2010). 
 57. Ellis Waldron, The Role of the Montana Supreme Court in Constitutional Revision, 
35 MONT. L. REV. 227, 229 (1974). 
 58. David R. Mason & William F. Crowley, Montana’s Judicial System—A Blueprint 
for Modernization, 29 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1967). 
 59. Id. at 11. 
 60. Legislative Council Report, supra note 55, at 39. 
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made without consultation with informed persons.”61 This was, 
however, consistently true only for district court judges, and was 
less often the case for supreme court justices. Indeed, from the 
adoption of the 1889 Constitution to its replacement in 1972, 
sixty-four of sixty-eight elections for supreme court justice were 
contested.62 These elections often were competitive. The 
average vote total for winning a supreme court justice was fifty-
two percent during the period of partisan judicial elections, and 
sixty-two percent during the period of nonpartisan judicial 
elections.63 Twenty incumbent justices lost reelection bids.64 
Before 1972, one-third of supreme court justices were initially 
appointed, but only one-third of those appointees went on to be 
elected for a full term.65 Judicial elections played a more 
significant role in the composition of the supreme court than the 
Council suggested. 
In a 1970 referendum, Montana voters called a 
Constitutional Convention.66 As the Convention approached, the 
Legislative Council’s 1968 report was supplemented by a 1969 
Constitution Revision Commission report, and by in-depth staff 
reports prepared by a legislatively authorized Constitutional 
Convention Commission.67 A subcommittee of the Revision 
Commission noted five failed attempts from 1945 to 1967 to 
ballot constitutional amendments adopting the Missouri Plan in 
Montana.68 The subcommittee, in consultation with a Judicial 
Reform Committee appointed by the Montana Bar Association, 
also largely endorsed the Mason-Crowley Blueprint, adding that 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. WALDRON & WILSON, supra note 44, at 289–304. 
 63. JAMES J. LOPACH, ET AL., WE THE PEOPLE OF MONTANA: WORKINGS OF A 
POPULAR GOVERNMENT 159 (1983) (counting judicial elections from 1889 to 1977). 
 64. Id. at 158 (counting judicial elections from 1889 to 1977). 
 65. Id. at 290–92; see also id. at 157 (noting that “[o]nly seven of fifteen appointed 
justices seeking an elective term were successful between 1889 and 1977”). 
 66. LARRY M. ELISON & FRITZ SNYDER, THE MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE 9 (2001). 
 67. Id. at 8–9 (also indicating that the Commission included representatives appointed 
by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches). 
 68. Montana Constitutional Convention Commission, Report No. 7: Constitutional 
Provisions Proposed by Constitution Revision Subcommittees 11 (1972). 
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“the constitution should permit the legislature to adopt a merit 
system of selection, and not require election of judges.”69  
When the Constitutional Convention delegates met in early 
1972, they had the benefit of a detailed report on the Montana 
courts and state judiciaries in general.70 The report explained 
that judicial elections arose from a combination of concerns 
about checking judicial review, the common-law authority of 
judges to make interstitial law, and populist critiques of lawyers 
as a class.71 It noted the sweep of judicial elections across most 
states in latter half of the nineteenth century, many states’ switch 
to nonpartisan elections in reaction to machine politics in the 
early twentieth century, and the advent of merit selection under 
the Missouri Plan in the latter half of the twentieth century.72 
Like the earlier Council Report, the Convention Commission 
Report misleadingly repeated that in practice, “the original 
selection of most of Montana’s appellate and trial court judges is 
not by the people but by the governor.”73 By 1972, four of the 
five supreme court justices had been appointed before being 
elected, though this was an anomaly; at the time those four 
justices represented more than half of the seven appointees 
elected since statehood.74  
The report explained that “[t]he major criticism of the 
elective system of judicial selection, be it partisan or non-
partisan, is that voter knowledge of candidates and their 
qualifications is insufficient to form a basis for a rational 
choice.”75 In Montana, where non-partisan elections lack the 
intermediation of party nomination, “candidates who would 
never be nominated by a party could be elected to political 
office by such irrelevant factors as a large campaign fund, a 
 
 69. Id. at 16. 
 70. Sandra R. Muckelston & Montana Constitutional Convention Commission, Report 
No. 14: The Judiciary (1972) (including appendices of model judicial articles from the 
American Bar Association, National Municipal League, and other reform groups, and a 
description of the Missouri Plan). 
 71. Id. at 133. 
 72. Id. at 134–35 (also explaining that at the time of the Convention, seventeen states 
selected judges by partisan elections, fourteen states by nonpartisan elections, fourteen 
states by appointment, and nine states by merit selection). 
 73. Id. at 136. 
 74. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 75. Muckelston, et al., supra note 70, at 138. 
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pleasing television image, or a preferential place on the 
ballot.”76 Non-partisan elections, the report found, also may 
aggravate the campaign finance problems associated with 
electing judges. Without a party’s financial base, a judicial 
candidate must “use his own resources or depend upon 
contributions from ‘friends,’ which may affect his impartiality 
just as much as those judges who receive financial support from 
party coffers.”77 One Montana justice estimated that he spent 
nine months of an election year campaigning for office.78 Yet 
without party labels, much of the campaigning may have been 
futile due to ballot roll-off in relatively low-information judicial 
races. “Prior to the adoption of the non-partisan ballot the Chief 
Justice race in various years polled 91 to 94 percent of the votes 
cast for the governor; this decreased to 77 [percent] seventeen 
years after initiation of the plan.”79  
These concerns led to legislative consideration of a merit 
plan for judicial selection in Montana at least five times between 
1945 and 1969.80 One of the more heavily debated bills was 
proposed in 1957, after “the Montana Supreme Court had 
amassed a three-year backlog of cases caused, in part, by 
justices’ campaigning for re-election in 1956,” and “some 
representatives felt a solution to the court’s backlog was 
elimination of the election of judges.”81 The nominating 
commission contemplated by the 1957 proposal consisted of five 
district judges from different regions of the state, the president 
of the Montana Bar Association, and three gubernatorial 
appointees confirmed by the senate: a farmer or rancher, a labor 
union member, and a businessman.82 The bill was defeated in 
the House by forty-six votes to forty-four, with broad support 
from Republicans but opposition from most Democrats, who 
were then in the majority.83 Opponents complained that the bill 
 
 76. Id. at 140. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (citing 1971 interview with Justice Frank Haswell). 
 79. Id. (citing MONTANA BAR ASSOCIATION, METHODS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION 
(1956)). 
 80. Id. at 148. 
 81. Id. at 149. 
 82. Id. at 148–49 (citing H.B. 48 35th Leg. Sess. § 6 (Mont. 1957)). 
 83. Id.; see also House J. 35th Leg. Sess. 399 (Mont. 1957). 
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was “undemocratic,” and “deprived the people of the right to 
decide for themselves what members of the legal profession 
should sit as judges.”84 The convention report viewed the merit 
plans favorably, but rebutted the opponents’ arguments by 
repeating the misleading claim that 
[b]ecause most district judges and supreme court justices 
were initially appointed by the governor to an interim 
vacancy and subsequently as an incumbent elected by the 
people for another term when the appointive term expired, 
two elements of the merit plan were already in existence: 
gubernatorial appointment and retention election.85 
Thus, according to the report, a merit plan would be more 
democratic, since “[t]hrough citizen representation on the 
nominating commission the electorate in effect would have had 
a voice in the initial choice of a judge—an element non-existent 
under Montana’s present system.”86 Again, however, this 
overstated the role of appointments in judicial selection, 
particularly with respect to the Montana Supreme Court of 1957: 
While approximately half of district judges (who outnumbered 
supreme court justices) were appointed at that time, nearly two-
thirds of then-sitting supreme court justices had been elected 
initially.87 
2. The Constitutional Convention of 1972 
The 1972 report and the earlier studies set the stage for an 
unusually deliberative discussion of judicial selection by the one 
hundred elected delegates of the Constitutional Convention. 
Twenty-four of the delegates were lawyers, and those lawyer-
delegates carried on most of the debate on the judicial article 
among themselves.88 The delegates’ consideration of the judicial 
article was among the longest and most divided at the 
 
 84. Muckelston, et al., supra note 70, at 149. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. WALDRON & WILSON, supra note 44, at 289. 
 88. Fritz Snyder & Mae Nan Ellingson, The Lawyer-Delegates of the 1972 Montana 
Constitutional Convention: Their Influence and Importance, 72 MONT. L. REV. 53, 86 
(2011) (noting that “[v]ery few delegates other than lawyers participated in the debate on 
the Judicial Article”). 
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Convention, consuming nearly two full days of debate.89 The 
Judiciary Committee divided five-to-four, issuing a majority and 
a minority report, and “split most sharply on the issue of how 
judges should be selected.”90 
The convention’s proceedings were notable for a general 
atmosphere of bipartisanship.91 Yet the Judiciary Committee’s 
votes substantially divided along party lines, even to the extent 
that party “trumped the divide between lawyers and non-lawyers 
on the Committee.”92 Democrats controlled the Committee six 
members to three, though in their work they broke into a 
working majority of five Democrats supporting the majority 
proposal, and three Republicans and a Democrat supporting a 
minority proposal.93 
The majority report retained much of the 1889 
Constitution’s provisions, including judicial elections.94 The 
minority report proposed a modified merit plan, in which “the 
governor of the state shall nominate a supreme court or district 
court judge from nominees selected in the manner provided by 
law,” with one opportunity for a contested election after 
appointment, followed by retention elections for each 
succeeding term of office.95 In extensive commentary, the 
minority observed “that today, few, if any, of the voters are at all 
acquainted with the judicial candidates,” and “the present 
system of elected judiciary utterly and completely fails to attain” 
 
 89. IV MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 1010–
1180 (1979) [hereinafter CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT].  
 90. Jean M. Bowman, The Judicial Article: What Went Wrong? 51 MONT. L. REV. 492, 
497 (1990); see also Judiciary Committee Report in I MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION, PROCEEDINGS 485 (1972) (indicating that “the members of the committee 
had philosophical differences, particularly about selection of judges”) [hereinafter 
CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS]. 
 91. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 66, at 11 (“The voters elected delegates on a 
partisan basis, but the sentiment in the convention was to organize it in a bipartisan fashion. 
Thus seating was alphabetical rather than by party. The president of the convention 
appointed both Democrats and Republicans to chair committees, and he appointed a 
delegate from the opposite party to be a co-chairperson of each committee.”) 
 92. Morriss, supra note 10, at 30. 
 93. The Democrat in the minority, J. Mason Melvin of Gallatin County, who had a law-
enforcement background, “may have been a relatively conservative Democrat.” Id. at 30 
n.19. 
 94. CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 90, at 495 (Majority Proposal § 6). 
 95. Id. at 511–12 (Minority Proposal § 7). 
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the informed electorate necessary for “the survival of democratic 
institutions.”96 At the same time, the minority was “especially 
apprehensive of the future political character of [Montana’s] 
judges,” citing “statistics revealing that an overwhelming 
majority” of the judges (but not supreme court justices) had 
“been appointed by the governor.”97 This modified Missouri 
Plan of commission nomination, executive appointment, and 
voter retention reflected elements of the so-called Montana 
Plan,98 but added the intervening opportunity for a contested 
election after appointment.99 
Despite the legal establishment’s support for a merit plan 
more like the minority’s hybrid proposal, the Judiciary 
Committee’s poll of nearly 500 lawyers in the state found that a 
slight majority favored judicial elections; over a hundred 
members of the Montana Trial Lawyers Association favored 
elections by more than a two-to-one margin.100 Delegate John 
M. Schiltz, a former legislator and an unsuccessful candidate for 
chief justice in 1970,101 made a case for judicial elections based 
on personal and political history. In Montana, he explained, “we 
have strong corporate influence; where, if I can elect a 
Governor, and through that office nominate and appoint the 
district and the Supreme Court judges, I can run this state. . . . I 
can own it.”102 Noting how the Anaconda Company and its 
former affiliate the Montana Power Company could dominate 
 
 96. Id. at 520. 
 97. Id. at 521. 
 98. See generally Mason & Crowley, supra note 58. 
 99. The Committee witness list named proponents of the Montana Plan including 
Professors Mason and Crowley of the Montana School of Law; the Dean of the Montana 
School of Law, Robert E. Sullivan; the Chief Justice of the Montana Supreme Court, J. T. 
Harrison; the President of the Montana Bar Association, William Bellingham; 
representatives of the American Judicature Society and Montana Citizens for Court 
Improvement, several state district judges (Paul Hatfield, W. W. Lessley, and Robert 
Wilson); and federal district judge Russell Smith. See CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS at 533–
36 (Appendix C). Interestingly, Francis Mitchell, a representative of the political reform 
group Montana Common Cause, opposed the Montana Plan and favored partisan election 
of Supreme Court justices. Id. at 534. 
 100. CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 89, at 1014 (statement of  Del. Holland). 
 101. See CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 90, at 58 (summarizing Schiltz 
biography); WALDRON & WILSON, supra note 44, at 290 (discussing Schiltz as a candidate 
for chief justice). 
 102. CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 89, at 1026 (statement of  Del. Schiltz). 
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appointment processes, including the Constitutional Convention 
Commission itself, he concluded that 
you cannot pick a committee in the State of Montana that 
will be totally free of that kind of influence. And I am 
afraid of it, and if I have to choose between one or the 
other, I’m going to the electorate every time, because I had 
a chance . . . to be elected. With another few bucks, I might 
have made it.103 
Delegate James C. Garlington, also a lawyer, argued for 
judicial appointment. “There is clear agreement on the part of all 
that we do need good judges,” he noted, “[t]he question is how 
to recruit them.”104 He expressed “utmost sympathy” for judicial 
candidates who “must undergo the type of ordeal that Mr. 
Schiltz very feelingly described.”105 He suggested that such an 
ordeal makes judicial office unattractive for most lawyers “who 
have any kind of a stable, private practice” because the judicial 
candidate “must sever himself completely from the private 
practice of law,” and should he return to practice after losing a 
campaign, “he then begins at absolute rock bottom . . . no 
clients, no office, no library, no nothing.”106 
Because the minority proposal represented a greater change 
from the current judicial article, and perhaps because delegates 
were initially more receptive to its reforms, the Convention 
voted to debate it instead of the minor changes contained in the 
majority proposal.107 Over the lengthy debate, however, 
amendments transformed key provisions of the minority report 
into something resembling the majority report’s election plan.108 
In a series of sharply divided votes the delegates eventually 
rejected both the majority and minority proposals and adopted 
Article VII, section 8, whose original text suggests its 
 
 103. Id. at 1027 (statement of  Del. Schiltz). 
 104. Id. at 1032 (statement of  Del. Garlington). 
 105. Id. (statement of  Del. Garlington). 
 106. Id. (statement of  Del. Garlington). 
 107. Id. at 1034–35; see also Snyder & Ellingson, supra note 88, at 86 (asserting that 
“[w]ith that vote, it became clear that a majority of the delegates favored judicial reform”). 
 108. Bowman, supra note 90, at 495 (reporting that “much of the majority report 
actually was adopted” and noting “the lack of major substantive change from the 1889 
Constitution” in the judicial article of the new constitution). 
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complicated origins.109 In a concession to merit selection, its 
first section provides “replacement . . . for any vacancy” by the 
governor’s appointment “from nominees selected in the manner 
provided by law,” subject to senate confirmation.110 Its second 
section provides for retention elections as the default, but 
permits contested elections.111 Its third section provides for an 
election “[i]f an incumbent does not run.”112 The result, in other 
words, was the maintenance of contested judicial elections, but 
with a merit plan of appointment by nominees from a selection 
committee in case of vacancies. Based on a campaign that noted, 
revealingly “[c]ontested election of judges is not changed,”113 
the people narrowly ratified the 1972 Constitution, including the 
new judicial article. 
3. Public Financing for Judicial Elections 
A collateral consequence of the debate at the Constitutional 
Convention was a failed proposal for public financing of judicial 
campaigns. The Judiciary Committee proposed a section 
requiring the legislature to “appropriate funds for the contested 
general election campaign expenses of candidates for the offices 
of justices of the supreme court and district court judges.”114 
Unlike the primary selection proposal, the public-financing 
proposal enjoyed broad support on the committee.115 Public 
 
 109. Snyder & Ellingson, supra note 88, at 88–90 (referring to principles involved, 
summarizing work of ad hoc committee, and describing portions of floor debate). 
 110. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 8(1) (1973). 
 111. Id. art. VII, § 8(2). 
 112. Id. art. VII, § 8(3). 
 113. MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, PROPOSED 1972 CONSTITUTION FOR 
THE STATE OF MONTANA: OFFICIAL TEXT WITH EXPLANATION 13 (1972). 
 114. CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 90, at 508 (setting out Separate Majority 
Proposal on Campaign Expenses). The proposal also prohibited expenditures “in excess of 
the amount appropriated,” an expenditure limit that would even then have been found 
unconstitutional. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1976) (holding that campaign 
expenditure limits “place substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, 
citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions that the 
First Amendment cannot tolerate”). 
 115. The reprinted report includes the names of all nine committee members under the 
proposal, but denotes the names of Delegates Pemberton, Bowman, and Berg as “(original 
unsigned).” CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 90, at 508 (setting out Separate 
Majority Proposal on Campaign Expenses). These were the three Republican delegates on 
the Committee; the others were Democrats. See id. at 31–64 (listing delegate biographies). 
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financing of judicial elections was not raised in any of the pre-
convention studies, and appeared to originate with the Judiciary 
Committee itself. Because the majority and minority proposals 
both contemplated contested non-partisan judicial elections, the 
entire committee recognized “the same problems we have 
always had” with judges running for office.116 These included 
(1) the necessity that the judge demean himself and his 
position by seeking campaign funds; 
(2) the fact that the wrong people can make contributions;  
(3) the fact that lawyers are the biggest contributors and 
solicitors of campaign funds to the detriment of themselves 
than the candidate; 
(4) the fact that the candidate with the most money to spend 
is the more likely to win regardless of merit; and 
(5) the fact that the appearance of justice suffers in the 
process.117 
The committee’s solution to these problems prompted a 
prescient discussion of campaign finance in judicial elections. 
Delegate Schiltz opened the debate on the public-financing 
provision, noting that the cost to taxpayers of financing judicial 
elections was a “pittance in view of the benefits,” including an 
“independent Judiciary” and assurance “that one man was not 
buying the job.”118 More broadly, he turned to the national 
presidential election then underway, noting that Edmund 
Muskie’s presidential campaign was “going to cost him or 
somebody $40 million.”119 Looking toward a future of big-
money campaigns, he warned that “this is going to come to 
Montana, and I can think of no other, better place to start as an 
experiment for a very small amount of money than on the 
Judiciary.”120 But Delegate Jean Bowman, who favored the 
appointment-and-retention-election plan of the minority 
 
Unlike votes on the primary majority and minority proposals, votes on the public-financing 
proposal appear to have broken along party lines. 
 116. Id. at 509 (including comments on Separate Majority Proposal on Campaign 
Expenses). 
 117. Id. 
 118. CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra n. 89, at 1137 (statement of Del. Schiltz). 
 119. Id. (statement of Del. Schiltz). 
 120. Id. (statement of Del. Schiltz). 
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proposal, suggested that if judicial candidates had to run in 
contested elections, they should look to the political parties for 
financial support.121 “As a taxpayer,” the Republican Bowman 
argued in response to the Democrat Schiltz, “I really do not wish 
to have part of my taxes go to someone’s campaign 
expenses.”122 
The delegates gave the public-financing proposal 
preliminary approval by a narrow margin, but voted later that 
day to reconsider the proposal, and opened a deeper debate on 
the issue.123 Delegate William Burkhardt reported that a lawyer 
friend wrote to him, stating that he hoped it would be “well 
debated before its death.”124 So it was. Several lawyers spoke in 
support. Delegate Wade Dahood argued that 
only the so-called “big boys” can afford to support 
[candidates] with enough campaign funds so that they can 
be successful; and as a consequence, being the imperfect 
beings that they are, just like the rest of us, subconsciously, 
at least, it has an effect upon their decision and upon their 
work in our behalf as part of the highest tribunal of this 
state.125 
Delegate and Convention President Leo Graybill asked whether 
the delegates were “going to let the Judiciary continue to get its 
money to run for contested Supreme Court offices by getting it 
from big . . . corporations and concerns who have a lot of 
litigation in the Supreme Court.”126 To the criticism that public 
financing would simply relieve lawyers from funding judicial 
campaigns, Delegate Graybill continued by asserting that “[t]he 
people that it’s going to relieve is the common people who have 
to go to that Supreme Court occasionally against some major 
interest who is there constantly.”127  
Opponents, however, doubted that the legislature would 
provide sufficient funding, and asked why only the judiciary 
should have public campaign financing entrenched in the 
 
 121. Id. (statement of Del. Bowman). 
 122. Id. (statement of Del. Bowman). 
 123. Id. at 1164–65. 
 124. Id. at 1165 (statement of Del. Burkhardt). 
 125. Id. at 1166 (statement of Del. Dahood). 
 126. Id. at 1167 (statement of Del. Graybill). 
 127. Id. (statement of Del. Graybill). 
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constitution. “If we can’t do it for . . . the Governor and all the 
rest of the candidates,” announced Delegate Grace Bates, “why, 
I don’t feel we should do it just for Supreme Court.”128 Delegate 
Joe Eskildsen, originally a proponent of the proposal on the 
Judiciary Committee, argued that 
when you look for political office, then you got to expect to 
find your own campaign funds and to finance it yourself. . . . 
I don’t think we should do anything for the Judiciary that 
we don’t do for the Legislature and, especially, that we 
don’t do for the Governor.129 
Delegate Garlington, a lawyer, raised free speech concerns, 
worried that the measure would “inhibit the rights of citizen 
groups to take an interest in” judicial elections.130 Delegate 
William Swanberg, another lawyer, raised concerns about 
circumvention: “[T]he state will be on the [hook] for the basic 
campaign expenses, and some candidate will find some way of 
getting around it.”131 By the end of the day’s debate, several 
delegates moved to adjourn and take “a chance to think about 
this overnight,” but those motions were defeated.132 Then the 
delegates voted to delete the provision.133 
Two weeks later, with the judiciary article reported out of 
the Style and Drafting Committee, Delegate Rick Champoux 
recalled an earlier point made by Delegate Schiltz: “[I]f we 
don’t provide the expenses for these judges, somebody else will, 
and that other group will be, in the main, large companies that 
come before this court, whether they do it directly or 
indirectly.”134 In response, the delegates suspended the rules to 
reconsider the proposal, but only as applied to supreme court 
 
 128. Id. at 1169 (statement of Del. Bates). Schiltz later responded to Bates by indicating 
that he hoped Montana would “someday” finance the campaigns of candidates in political 
campaigns as well as those in judicial races, but pointing out that “in the meantime 
[candidates for political offices] have the advantage of running on a partisan ticket.” Id. at 
1177 (statement of Del. Schiltz). 
 129. Id. (statement of Del. Eskildsen). 
 130. Id. at 1173 (statement of Del. Garlington). 
 131. Id. at 1177 (statement of Del. Swanberg). 
 132. See, e.g., id. at 1168 (motion of Del. Babcock); see also id. at 1170–71 (motion of 
Del. Babcock asking for proposal to be printed and distributed overnight so that the 
delegates could  study it in the morning). 
 133. Id. at 1178–79, 1181. 
 134. Id. at 2189 (statement of Del. Champoux). 
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justices.135 Judges “are supposed to decide fairly and evenly 
between all of us after they get elected,” Delegate Graybill 
reminded the delegates during the debate that followed, pointing 
out that “[i]t’s one thing to support a senator or a congressman 
and have him help you out with a bureaucracy; it’s another thing 
to support a judge and have him help you out with a 
decision.”136 
Delegate Garlington, however, had already advised against 
an unprecedented constitutional provision for public financing: 
“[I]t seems to me the proper judgment here is to leave this to 
such time as it may genuinely prove in our own state to be an 
evil that needs correction, and then our people’s representatives, 
the Legislature, can do so.”137 And Delegate Dave Drum 
observed that public financing might upset the longstanding 
tradition of the lawyers-money primary, whereby “you may 
wind up with the gentleman as a Supreme Court justice who the 
legal fraternity generally thinks will be the best judge.”138 Others 
raised fiscal concerns that voters might reject a new constitution 
with spending mandates that seemed to have been included “in 
order to finance all the political aspirations of our lawyers 
wanting to run for Supreme Court justice or other higher 
offices.”139 Delegate Dahood responded by arguing that “[t]he 
taxpayer, above all, should have paramount interest in this 
proposal” because “[h]e is the one that is affected by the quality 
of justice, more than anyone else.”140 This time, the delegates 
adopted the proposal by fifty-five votes to thirty-two.141 
 
 135. Id. at 2190–91. 
 136. Id. at 2198 (statement of Del. Graybill). 
 137. Id. at 2196 (statement of Del. Garlington). 
 138. Id. at 2201 (statement of Del. Drum). 
 139. Id. at 2199 (statement of Del. Erdmann); see also id. at 2200–01 (statement of  Del. 
Kamhoot expressing concern about taxpayer reaction to funding mandates when voting on 
whether to approve the new constitution). 
 140. Id. at 2201 (statement of Del. Dahood). 
 141. Id. at 2204–05. Yet the debate was not quite over. Delegates adopted the Style and 
Drafting Committee report on the reconsidered proposal by voice vote, but not before 
Delegate John Toole, a former Republican legislator, said that he had “talked to a number 
of Legislators about this in the last few days,” and “[t]hey seem[ed] to be of the unanimous 
opinion they will appropriate $1” for judicial campaign expenses. Id. at 2432 (Statement of 
Del. Toole). 
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All that remained was final consideration of the judicial 
article. The Convention adopted the first thirteen sections—
including the compromise judicial-selection section—by wide 
margins.142 But when the Convention reached the final section 
of the judicial article, on campaign expenses, the ayes fell three 
votes short of a majority.143 The Convention sent the Sergeant to 
find absent delegates, and voted upon their return to reconsider. 
But in a final vote, with all but three of the delegates present, the 
public-financing proposal fell short again.144 After an agonizing 
series of debates, what would have been a major innovation in 
state judicial elections failed by just two votes. 
4. Implementation and Modifications 
The implementation of the new constitution’s hybrid merit 
plan for appointees though a judicial nomination commission 
fell short of the reformers’ aspirations even for a compromise. 
According to the new judicial article, “the governor shall 
appoint a replacement [for a vacant judicial office] from 
nominees selected in the manner provided by law.”145 The 
minority report, “not satisfied with the current process of 
unlimited gubernatorial appointive power of judges,” had 
expressed a preference that “the committee should be elected by 
the legislature for staggered terms” and “bi-partisan in 
character.”146 The minority report, however, had “purposely 
refrained from attempting to provide for the organization of the 
nominating committee in the belief that the legislature is better 
able to vigilantly oversee its operation.”147 In 1973, a 
Democratic majority in the legislature enacted—and a 
Democratic governor signed—a bill creating a seven-member 
 
 142. Id. at 2434–49. The votes became so routine, in fact, that the President of the 
Convention, Delegate Graybill, noticed that several delegates were forgetting to vote: “I 
don’t want to disturb you people—(Laughter)—but if you want to vote, now is the time.” 
Id. at 2441 (Statement of Del. Graybill). 
 143. Id. at 2450. 
 144. Id. at 2453 (showing the final vote tally on the public-funding section of the judicial 
article as forty-nine to forty-eight). 
 145. Mont. Const. Art. VII, § 8(2). 
 146. CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 90, at 520–21 (Minority Proposal § 7 
comments). 
 147. Id. at 521. 
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judicial nomination commission controlled by a majority of four 
members appointed by the governor, not the legislature.148  
Proponents of broader reforms hardly welcomed the 
compromise judicial article. Delegate Mason Melvin, a 
Democrat who signed onto the reform-minded minority report 
with the three Republicans on the Judiciary Committee, later 
noted with regret that “the Legislature tossed the mechanics of 
the appointment of judges right into the political kettle” by 
giving the governor the power to appoint the majority of the 
nominating commission.149 But he also pointed out that “when 
Montanans decide to take another step in insulating the Judiciary 
from the other branches—and politics—corrections will be 
made.”150 Delegate Jean Bowman, also in the minority on the 
Judiciary Committee, agreed, writing years later that the 1972 
Constitution “bungles the method of selection process,” because 
it “provides for neither pure election nor merit selection and, at 
best, constitutionalizes uncertainty in the constitution in the 
method of selection.”151 The judge for whom Delegate Bowman 
later clerked, Justice John C. Harrison, reached a harsher 
judgment: the “worst judiciary article in fifty states.”152 
The legislature and voters appear to agree that the 
Convention left room for improvement. The judicial article is 
among the most frequently amended articles in the Montana 
Constitution, with voters approving all four constitutional 
referenda amending the article.153 Sometimes popular backlash 
prompted these judicial reforms. 
 
 148. MONT. LAWS 1177, ch. 470, § 1 (1973). The commission consists of “four lay 
members who are neither judges nor attorneys” appointed by the governor from different 
regions and vocations, two attorneys appointed by the supreme court from different 
regions, and one district judge elected by the district judges. MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-
1001. The members serve staggered four-year terms. MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-1002. 
 149. Mason Melvin, Judiciary Committee, in 100 DELEGATES: MONTANA 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1972 at 31 (1989). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Bowman, supra note 90, at 498. 
 152. LOPACH ET AL., supra n. 63, at 150 (quoting 1980 Interview with Justice John C. 
Harrison). 
 153. Johnstone, supra note 56, at 355. One of those amendments comprehensively 
revised the selection provision in 1992, twenty years after its adoption. See H.B. 353 
(Mont. 52nd Leg. Sess. 1992) (proposing language that became amendment 22 to the 
Montana Constitution). 
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In the 1980s, the Montana Supreme Court confronted the 
legislature repeatedly in cases involving the constitutionality of 
tort immunity and welfare reform.154 By the end of the decade, 
vote changes on the court and constitutional amendments by the 
people resolved much of the controversy.155 Yet concern about 
the court’s potential overreach lingered.156 
Calls to broaden the scope of judicial elections, and narrow 
remaining opportunities for judicial appointments, intensified in 
response to a 1990 case upholding three judicial appointments, 
including a supreme court appointment, made without 
submitting the appointees to an election on the next possible 
ballot. The Montana Supreme Court interpreted Article VII, 
section 8, to postpone the election of an appointed justice or 
judge until after the senate had the opportunity to confirm or 
reject the appointee.157 The court emphasized that section eight 
provided “a selection system which gives recognition to both 
appointment and election,” reiterating the incomplete history 
that “most of the justices and judges” (in fact, most of the judges 
but few of the justices) were appointed initially.158 Further, the 
court noted that “[t]he current makeup of the judiciary reflects 
the delegates’ recognition of both appointment and election,” as 
“[e]ighteen of the thirty-six currently serving District Court 
Judges and three of the seven currently serving Supreme Court 
Justices began their offices as appointees.”159 
In 1992, critics of the decision upholding these judicial 
appointments proposed a constitutional amendment requiring 
appointees to stand for election regardless of whether the senate 
had yet had an opportunity to confirm them during one of its 
biennial sessions. Proponents of the amendment argued that too 
many “holdover” appointees held office for years pending 
 
 154. See James J. Lopach, The Montana Supreme Court in Politics, 48 MONT. L. REV. 
267 (1987) (criticizing the court); see also Bari R. Burke, Constitutional Initiative 30: 
What Constitutional Rights Did Montanans Surrender in Hopes of Securing Liability 
Insurance? 48 MONT. L. REV. 53 (1987) (criticizing the legislature). 
 155. See Johnstone, supra note 56, at 357–59. 
 156. See Lopach, supra note 154, at 296 (“The court’s insistence that it must have the 
last word in state policymaking has severely damaged democratic politics.”). 
 157. State ex rel. Racicot v. Dist. Court, 794 P.2d 1180 (Mont. 1990). 
 158. Id. at 1185. 
 159. Id. 
JOHNSTONEPERSONAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2015 2:36 PM 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN MONTANA 75 
confirmation without standing for election. The amendment 
eliminated “the potential for the improper use of the 
appointment process,” according to the proponents, under a 
constitution that provides “for the electoral selection of 
judges.”160 Montanans ratified the amendment by a three-to-one 
margin.161 The election results suggested that voters viewed 
these holdover appointments as a bug, not a feature, of the 
constitution’s judicial-selection process. 
The constitutional journey of judicial reform began with the 
Montana Plan for merit selection. At the Constitutional 
Convention, it moved through the minority report’s emphasis on 
commission nominations with retention elections. With 
ratification of the original section 8, it led to an uneasy 
compromise of appointments and contested elections during the 
state constitution’s first two decades. The journey ended (for 
now, at least) with the 1992 amendment, an emphatic doubling 
down, by constitutional referendum, on judicial elections.162 
 
 160. Montana Secretary of State, 1992 Voter Information 5 (1992). 
 161. Montana Secretary of State 1972–Present Historical Constitutional Initiatives and 
Constitutional Amendments, 7 (Feb. 26, 2013), http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/forms/history/ 
constitutionalmeasureslist2012.pdf (accessed Sept. 8, 2015; copy on file with Journal of 
Appellate Practice and Process). The amendment clarified that “Supreme court justices and 
district court judges shall be elected by the qualified electors as provided by law,” and that 
“[n]o appointee, whether confirmed or unconfirmed, shall serve past the term of his 
predecessor without standing for election.” Mont. Const. Art. VII, § 8. 
 162.  In 2006 voters petitioned for a constitutional amendment providing for recall of 
judges and justices for “any reason acknowledging electoral dissatisfaction with a justice or 
judge,” a broader standard than that required by prior law. See Montana Secretary of State, 
2006 Voter Information 20 (2006) (addressing Constitutional Initiative No. 98). Proponents 
in the legislature argued that it would “be a powerful tool for judicial accountability and 
democratic oversight of a branch of government that for too long has been too removed 
from the will of the people.” Id. at 22 (statements of Rep. Edward B. Butcher, Rep. Diane 
Rice, and Rep. Michael Lange). It would, they argued, “allow us to challenge judges who 
throw violent criminals and pedophiles out on the street, ‘legislate’ radical political 
agendas or destroy our constitutional freedoms.” Id. at 24. Three retired justices wrote in 
opposition to the amendment because “[t]he rights and protection of our citizens are 
dependent upon a fair, impartial and unbiased judiciary,” and “[i]f the judges were 
confronted with the threat of constant and repeated recall elections, they would be 
distracted from the performance of their duties and subjected to great expense in defending 
recall elections.” Id. 23 (statements of former Justice John C. Harrison, former Chief 
Justice Jean Turnage, and former Justice John C. Sheehy). The amendment was decertified 
and struck from the ballot for fraud in the petition process. See Montanans for Just. v. State 
ex. rel. McGrath, 146 P.3d 759 (Mont. 2006). 
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III. A MODERN PRACTICE OF STATE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
A. Appointments, Retention, and Elections 
Despite arguments during the Constitutional Convention 
about whether appointed or elected justices were the norm in 
Montana, and the renewed debate during the 1992 amendment 
campaign, appointments of justices increased slightly since 1972 
without notable comment. Eleven of the 27 justices seated under 
the new constitution—or forty-one percent—were appointed 
initially, up from one-third under the old constitution.163 Of the 
eleven appointees, six were reelected.164 Earlier commentators 
described “justices who resigned before completion of a term so 
that a politically allied governor could appoint a replacement,” 
and others who “endured under personally adverse conditions to 
prevent a replacement being appointed by an unfriendly 
governor.”165 Yet there is no evidence since 1972 that justices 
timed retirements to coincide with a governor of the same party 
as the governor who appointed them.166  
Every incumbent justice who sought reelection won except 
for Charles Erdman, a recent appointee who lost to the slightly 
better financed private practitioner James Regnier in 1996.167 In 
contests for open seats, the candidate who raised the most 
 
 163. Anthony Johnstone, Montana Supreme Court Justices Dataset (on file with Author) 
[hereinafter Justices Dataset]. The source data from 1912 to 2014 is available from the 
state of Montana. Montana Secretary of State, Montana Statewide General Election 
Canvass, 1912–2014, http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/archives/index.asp (accessed Nov. 10, 
2015; copy of main page on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).  The 
source data from 1889 to 1910 is available in WALDRON & WILSON, supra note 44, at 
289–92. Included in the eleven appointees is Justice Frank Haswell, who was appointed to 
Chief Justice from Associate Justice in 1977. 
 164. Id. 
 165. LOPACH ET AL., supra note 63, at 157. 
 166. Four appointees retired before the ends of their terms. Two appointees of 
Democrats retired under Republican governors: John C. Sheehy (appointed by Governor 
Thomas Judge in 1978 and resigned under Governor Stan Stephens in 1991) and R.C. 
McDonough (appointed by Governor Ted Schwinden in 1987 and resigned under Governor 
Marc Racicot in 1993). One appointee of a Republican retired during the appointing 
governor’s term: Diane Barz (appointed by Governor Stan Stephens in 1989 and resigned 
in 1991 when Stephens was still in office). The other appointee of a Republican, John 
Warner, retired under a Democratic governor (appointed by Governor Judy Martz in 2003 
and resigned under Governor Brian Schweitzer in 2009). Justices Dataset, supra note 163. 
 167. Id. 
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money won except for Judge Edward McLean in 2004, who lost 
to State Solicitor Brian Morris despite raising more money, and 
private practitioner Beth Baker, who beat District Judge Nels 
Swandal in a relatively low-dollar campaign.168 Of twenty-seven 
elections for supreme court justice since 1990, including post-
appointment elections for the remainder of an appointee’s first 
term, twelve were uncontested.169 
B. Increasing Partisanship 
Partisanship only recently emerged as a major issue in 
Montana Supreme Court campaigns. That is not to say that 
voters respected a barrier between judicial and legislative or 
executive offices, even after non-partisan elections began in 
1935. Montanans occasionally elected partisan politicians to the 
supreme court, and elected justices to partisan political office. 
Six state attorneys general moved from in front of the bench to 
behind it, including current Chief Justice Mike McGrath.170 Two 
governors became justices, and two justices became governors, 
including former associate justice Forrest H. Anderson, who 
governed during the 1972 Montana Constitutional 
Convention.171 A half-dozen justices came to the bench with 
experience as state legislators, including two-term Chief Justice 
Jean Turnage, who served two decades as a state legislator, and 
current Justices Jim Rice and Mike Wheat.172  
Party affiliations appeared as an issue in the hard-fought 
2000 races for chief justice and associate justice, when three of 
the four candidates in the general election had histories of 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. The six are Albert J. Galen; Wellington D. Rankin; Sam C. Ford; Harrison J. 
Freebourn; R.V. Bottomly; and Mike McGrath. Id. John W. Bonner served as Attorney 
General before he was elected as Governor, and then to the Supreme Court. See id. 
 171. Sam V. Stewart and John W. Bonner both served as governor before serving as 
justices. Hugh R. Adair served as lieutenant governor before serving as a justice. Sam C. 
Ford and Forrest H. Anderson served as justices before serving as governor. Id. 
 172. Hugh R. Adair, Forrest H. Anderson, John C. Sheehy, Jean A. Turnage, James A. 
Rice, and Mike Wheat all served in the legislature before joining the court, and Henry C. 
Smith served in the state senate after leaving the bench. Id. 
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contributing significant amounts to Democratic candidates.173 In 
2008, the supreme court revised the Code of Judicial Conduct to 
prevent judicial candidates from attending partisan campaign 
events.174 Justice Jim Rice (a former legislator) and Justice John 
Warner dissented from the change on grounds that suggest the 
informal, background role of partisan politics in past Montana 
judicial campaigns. Justice Rice observed that  
such practices reflect the reality of Montana culture, partic-
ularly within our many small, rural communities. . . . I re-
call attending a Republican dinner in a rural county which 
was also attended by a large contingent of local Democrats. 
Everyone was grinning from ear to ear, because it was 
more about community than anything else.175 
More recently, in a 2010 associate justice contest, Judge Nels 
Swandal ran an ad purportedly distancing himself from partisan 
politics, explaining his family has “always supported Republican 
candidates,” but his “political opinions have never influenced 
my decisions.”176 He lost the election, and went on to be elected 
as a Republican state senator in 2014.177  
After Citizens United, and in an increasingly polarized 
partisan atmosphere in the state, judicial elections came to the 
forefront of party politics. In 2011 the Montana Legislature 
referred to the voters LR-119, a Republican-sponsored measure 
carried by a vote that hewed closely to party lines. It was a 
legislative referendum (not a constitutional amendment, which 
would have required a legislative supermajority) to elect 
supreme court justices by districts and select the chief justice by 
 
 173. Erin P. Billings, Supreme Court Candidates Give Primarily to Democrats, Helena 
Indep. Record, Nov. 2, 2000, available at http://helenair.com/news/local/supreme-court-
candidates-give-primarily-to-democrats/article_581b74e1-80cc-5a96-928a-97caef5d0983.h 
tml. 
 174. In the Matter of the 2008 Montana Code of Judicial Conduct, No. AF 08-0203 
(Dec. 12, 2008). 
 175. Id. at 6–7 (Rice and Warner, JJ., concurring and dissenting). 
 176. Swandal for Justice, Set the Record Straight, available at BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 
(Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Buying%20Time 
%202010/STSUPCT_MT_SWANDAL_SET_RECORD_STRAIGHT.pdf (accessed Sept. 
8, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
177 See, e.g., Montana Legislature 64th Session, Nels Swandal (R) SD 30, http://leg.mt.gov 
/css/Sessions/64th/leg_info.asp?HouseID=2&SessionID=109&LAWSID=16524 (May 14, 
2014) (accessed Sept. 8, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and 
Process). 
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majority vote of the justices.178 In a challenge brought by a 
group of voters including Constitutional Convention Delegates 
Arlyne Reichert, Wade Dahood, and Jean Bowman, the 
Supreme Court held the referendum “facially unconstitutional” 
because it attempted to amend by statute the constitutional 
qualifications for election to justice.179 After the 2012 elections, 
several Republican legislative leaders discussed a plan to 
“chang[e] the face of the Montana Supreme Court.”180 The focus 
on judicial elections became part of developing a “long term 
strategy . . . to actually elect a majority of conservatives in both 
(the House and Senate), adopt conservative legislation and have 
a court that will uphold it.”181 
C. Campaign Finance 
1. Direct Contributions 
Since 1990, which marks the earliest extent of detailed 
campaign-finance records in Montana, the average amount of 
campaign contributions raised per race by all statewide 
candidates in both primary and general elections is about 
$231,000 overall and $460,000 in contested elections.182 But the 
average supreme court candidate raised about $139,000 overall, 
and $212,000 in a contested election,183 which puts supreme 
 
 178. See S.B. 268, 2011 MONT. LAWS ch. 203. 
 179. See Reichert v. State ex rel. McCulloch, 278 P.3d 455, 483 (Mont. 2012). 
 180. Associated Press, Emails Document GOP Leadership Power Struggle, Missoulian, 
Jan 16, 2013, available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/montana- 
legislature/emails-document-gop-leadership-power-struggle/article_ce884f7c-5ffd-11e2-96 
b6-0019bb2963f4.html 
 181. Id. 
 182. Anthony Johnstone, Montana Supreme Court Campaign-Finance Dataset (on file 
with Author) [hereinafter Campaign-Finance Dataset]. The source data are available from 
National Institute on Money in State Politics, Contributions to State Supreme Court 
Candidates in Elections in Montana Selected Years, available at followthemoney.org,  
http://www.followthemoney.org/showme?s=MT&y=2014,2012,2010,2008,2006,2004,2002, 
2000,1998,1996,1994,1992,1990&f - c o r e = 1& c-e x i = 1 & c - r - o t = J # [ { 1 | g r o = d - I n s { 4 | (2015). 
For comparability, all cited amounts from the Campaign-Finance Dataset are adjusted to 
2014 dollars and rounded to the nearest thousand. (The adjustment takes the nominal 
amount reported for a campaign year, multiplies it by the Consumer Price Index for 2014, 
then divides it by the Consumer Price Index for the campaign year.) 
 183. Calculations for contested elections exclude noncompetitive candidates who raised 
less than ten percent of the amount raised by the winning candidate. 
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court campaigns near the low end of the second-tier (non-
gubernatorial) statewide elections in Montana.184 The largest 
source of campaign contributions in supreme court elections, not 
surprisingly, is lawyers and lobbyists: In inflation-adjusted 
terms, supreme court candidates raised about $6.24 million 
between 1990 and 2014, and nearly a third of that total—$1.97 
million—came from lawyers and lobbyists.185 The other 
significant source is the candidates themselves, their 
contributions amounting to $1.35 million, or nearly a quarter of 
the total.186 Less than six percent of campaign contributions 
have come from out-of-state sources.187  
Before the rise of independent expenditures after Citizens 
United, three supreme court campaigns stand out as the most 
expensive in contribution terms. In 1992, Justice Terry 
Trieweiler raised $275,000 challenging incumbent Chief Justice 
Jean Turnage, who raised $360,000 successfully defending his 
seat.188 Two years earlier, Trieweiler had raised the second- 
highest total of any judicial candidate in Montana to win a seat 
as associate justice in 1990; just more than half of the $452,000 
came from his own pockets.189 In 1994 Montana voters 
approved I-118, which reduced individual contribution limits for 
supreme court candidates from $750 (about $1200 in 2014 
dollars) to $200, an amount that is now adjusted for inflation 
($320 in 2014).190 
Under the lower contribution limits, some candidates relied 
more on their own bank accounts and less on individual and 
political-committee contributions. In the 2000 election for 
associate justice, Justice Patricia Cotter raised $366,000 (most of 
it self-financed) to fend off three other candidates in primary and 
general elections.191 Also in 2000, Justice Trieweiler ran again 
for chief justice, raising $436,000 (again, most of it self-
 
 184. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-216 (1994); MONT. ADMIN. R. § 44.10.338(1) (2013); 
Montana Secretary of State, 1994 Voter Information 26 (discussing I-118). 
 191. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182. 
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financed) in a contest against his colleague Justice Karla Gray, 
who raised $499,000 and won.192 In inflation-adjusted terms, 
these were the third-highest and highest fundraising totals for a 
Montana court candidate, and at just short of one million dollars, 
the campaigns amounted to the most expensive Supreme Court 
race then on record.193 In the 2004 contest between Justice 
James Nelson and challenger Republican State Representative 
Cindy Younkin, Nelson raised about $286,000 to defeat 
Younkin, who raised $382,388, putting both candidates in the 
top ten for campaign contributions since 1990.194 
2. Independent Expenditures 
Independent-expenditure records are more limited than 
those for direct contributions.195 There is, however, evidence of 
significant outside money in races beginning in the competitive 
2000 campaigns for chief justice and associate justice, nearly all 
of it from the Montana Trial Lawyers Association affiliate, the 
Montana Law PAC.196 In that race for chief justice, still the most 
expensive in Montana history in terms of direct contributions, 
Justice Karla Gray asked her opponent Justice Terry Trieweiler 
to oppose independent expenditures in the campaign, 
particularly from the Montana Trial Lawyers Association, whose 
prior affiliations with Justice Trieweiler gave “the appearance of 
an improperly coordinated effort,” according to Justice Gray.197 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. At the time of the elections considered here, Montana regulations interpreted 
reportable independent expenditures narrowly to include only “communications expressly 
advocating the success or defeat of a candidate,” and not the broader category of reportable 
“electioneering communications” in current law. Compare MONT. ADMIN. R.  
§ 44.10.323(3) (2013) (defining “independent expenditure” as express advocacy) with 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-101(15) (2015) (defining “electioneering communication” as 
publicly distributed materials referring to “clearly identified candidates”). 
 196. A 1996 filing suggests that the Montana Law PAC raised about $18,000 (2014 
dollars) to support challenger James Regnier. See Montana Commissioner of Political 
Practices, Montana Law-Pac, Form C-6 (Jan. 30, 1997) (Closing Report). 
 197. Erin P. Billings, Gray Asks Trieweiler to Reject Third-Party Spending in Race, 
Helena Indep. Record, July 18, 2000, available at http://helenair.com/news/local/gray-asks 
-trieweiler-to-reject-third-party-spending-in-race/article_829f8d56-6203-574e-af1d-4f4a9c 
79ed5a.html. 
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In that year’s race for associate justice, one candidate 
complained of a “push poll . . . purportedly being taken by an 
unknown national interest group . . . to unjustly influence 
Montana voters.”198 In the 2000 campaigns, the Montana Law 
PAC sent out mailings supporting Justice Trieweiler at a cost of 
about $82,000 and Justice Patricia Cotter at a cost of about 
$85,000.199 The Montana Law PAC also spent $150,000 in 
support of two candidates in the 2002 campaign; recent 
appointee Jim Rice, who ran unopposed, and Justice William 
Leaphart, who faced a challenger and enjoyed significant 
support from trial lawyer contributions.200  
In a bitter 2004 campaign for one of two associate justice 
seats, the Montana Law PAC raised significant amounts of 
money to support Justice James Nelson in anticipation of the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce entering the race on behalf of his 
challenger, Republican State Representative Cindy Younkin.201 
It spent as much as $409,000 that year,202 prompting Younkin to 
claim that “[t]he Montana trial lawyers bought the race, and I 
think that’s a sad commentary on the state of judicial affairs in 
Montana.”203 One commentator noted that “a Younkin victory 
 
 198. Erin P. Billings, Tweeten Asks Cotter to Disavow National Poll, Missoulian, Sept. 
8, 2000, available at http://missoulian.com/uncategorized/tweeten-asks-cotter-to-disavow- 
national-poll/article_2820aa41-2226-541e-bad5-23a7c2a2f591.html. 
 199. Erin P. Billings, Gray Files Complaint over State Trial Lawyer Mailing, Billings 
Gazette, Nov. 4, 2000, available at http://billingsgazette.com/news/local/gray-files-complaint- 
over-state-trial-lawyer-mailing/article_ea448fc9-ee5f-544d-8c3a-c60e24fcec24.html. 
 200. Mike Dennison, “Outside Money” Haunts Court Race, Great Falls Tribune, Sept. 
27, 2004, available at http://archive.greatfallstribune.com/news/stories/20040927/localnews 
/1310006.html (indicating that “[t]he Montana Law PAC spent $150,000 on ads and 
literature to help two Supreme Court candidates in 2002”); Campaign-Finance Dataset, 
supra note 182. 
 201. Dennison, supra note 200; Shaila Dewan, Montana Judicial Race Joins Big-Money 
Fray, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 2014, at A11 (quoting the executive director of the trial 
lawyers’ group about the 2004 race, who characterized its work in that election as “trying 
to ensure that candidates were credible and had experience with Montana law,” and who 
noted that “the challenger was inexperienced and the group anticipated a large amount of 
spending from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that never materialized”). 
 202. Dewan, supra note 201 (reporting on “a 2004 race in which the Montana Trial 
Lawyers Association contributed $326,000 to retain a justice, James C. Nelson”); 
Dennison, supra n. 200 (reporting in September that “[t]he Law PAC had $138,000 in its 
account as of June, and its next report isn’t due until late October.”). 
 203. Len Iwanski, Younkin: Trial Lawyers ‘Bought the Race’ for Nelson; Morris Beats 
McLean, Assoc. Press, Nov. 2, 2004, available at http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and 
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could tip the political balance of the seven-member court in a 
direction favored by business interests and law enforcement,” 
but the Chamber did not appear.204 Several races from 2006 
through 2010 either were uncontested or did not appear to 
involve significant independent expenditures. As the Montana 
Trial Lawyers Association executive director told the New York 
Times during the 2014 campaign, “[i]n 2006, 2008, ‘10, ‘12, we 
didn’t spend anything—nothing, zero.”205  
The first Montana Supreme Court campaign waged entirely 
after Citizens United came in 2012, when independent 
expenditures played a larger role and raised new questions about 
so-called dark-money groups. Associate Justice James Nelson 
announced his retirement in early 2011, noting that judicial 
campaigns “are expensive, time consuming and increasingly 
partisan.”206 Three candidates announced: trial lawyer Elizabeth 
Best, district court judge Laurie McKinnon, and criminal 
defense attorney Ed Sheehy. In the primary, Best raised more 
money than the other two candidates combined, most of it from 
other lawyers and her own funding, but finished a close third in 
what was nearly a three-way tie.207 The Montana Trial Lawyers 
Association provided significant support through its members’ 
contributions to Best’s campaign, but did not make independent 
expenditures in the primary.208 Best’s loss in the primary 
surprised observers, some of whom credited Sheehy’s name 
 
-regional/montana/younkin-trial-lawyers-bought-the-race-for-nelson-morris-beats/article_1  
277e654-8312-5a0f-ad31-e75b59096ce7.html. 
 204. Dennison, supra note 200; see also Ray Ring, State Judges Get Political: Special-
Interest Money Pours into Hotly Contested Judge Campaigns, High Country News, Oct. 
11, 2004, available at http://www.hcn.org/issues/284/15051. 
 205. Dewan, supra note 201. 
 206. Associated Press, Montana Supreme Court Justice Nelson to Retire, Billings 
Gazette, Feb. 1, 2011, available at http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/mont 
ana/montana-supreme-court-justice-nelson-to-retire/article_e3f72dcc-2e33-11e0-b328-001c 
cc4c002e0.html. 
 207. Michael Beckel, Judicial Candidate Blames Mystery Nonprofit’s Attacks for Defeat, 
Center for Public Integrity (May 16, 2013), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/ 
013/05/16/12656/judicial-candidate-blames-mystery-nonprofits-attacks-defeat; Campaign-
Finance Dataset, supra note 182. 
 208. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182; Dewan, supra note 201 (quoting 
Montana Trial Lawyers Association executive director’s summary of independent 
expenditures: “In 2006, 2008, ’10, ’12, we didn’t spend anything—nothing, zero”). 
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recognition as the nephew of a longtime Montana Supreme 
Court Justice John “Skeff” Sheehy.209 
The decisive factors included mailers from an organization 
called the Montana Growth Network, which criticized Best and 
Sheehy for past campaign contributions to Democrats and 
praised McKinnon as “the only non-partisan choice for supreme 
court justice.”210 That group was founded by a Republican state 
senator, and in the general election it sent two additional mailers 
attacking Sheehy.211 Although the group disclosed spending 
about $42,000 on the mailers in the primary—more than either 
McKinnon or Sheehy raised in their own primary campaigns—it 
did not disclose its general election expenditures.212 Tax filings 
show that the group spent about $690,000 that year on ads 
concerning “judicial fairness” as well as “energy and the 
environment, taxes and the economy and healthcare,” and raised 
most of its funds from five unnamed donors including four 
contributions of more than $100,000.213 A significant amount of 
that spending bought mailers and broadcast advertisements 
attacking Sheehy in the general election.214 American Tradition 
Partnership also entered the campaign with a major mailing 
attacking Sheehy, a development perhaps related to a more than 
$50,000 transfer it received that year from Montana Growth 
 
 209. Charles S. Johnson, Dissecting a Montana Primary of Surprises, Crossover Voters, 
Ravalli Republic, June 9, 2012, available at http://ravallirepublic.com/news/state-and-region 
al/article_31bce989-b1ff-5899-9bc6-ffb102777ccd1.html. 
 210. Beckel, supra note 207. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id.; Michael Beckel, Montana State Senators Raise Big Bucks with Secretive 
Nonprofit; Conservative Montana Growth Network Spent Heavily during Supreme Court 
Elections, Helena Indep. Record, May 4, 2014, available at  http://helenair.com/news/local  
/montana-state-senators-raise-big-bucks-with-secretive-nonprofit/article_03c4fc80-d352-11 
e3-8f16-0019bb2963f4.html (indicating that the group’s general-election expenditures 
“went unreported with state regulators because it did not explicitly urge people to cast their 
votes against Sheehy”). 
 213. Montana Growth Network, Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from Income 
Tax (2012), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/05/03/14709/montana-growth-network- 
filing [hereinafter MGN 990] (accessed Sept. 10, 2015; copy on file with Journal of 
Appellate Practice and Process). 
 214. See, e.g., Mike Dennison, Pro-Business Group’s Ad Attacks Montana Supreme 
Court Candidate on Death Penalty, Missoulian, Oct. 16, 2012, available at http://missoulian 
.com/news/state-and-regional/pro-business-group-s-ad-attacks-montana-supreme-court-can 
didate/article_4af2a4cc-17f1-11e2-b259-001a4bcf887a.html; Beckel, supra note 207; 
Beckel, supra note 212. 
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Network.215 McKinnon disavowed the attacks on her opponent, 
saying “[m]udslinging diminishes the prestige of our highest 
court.”216 While the sources and total amount of independent 
expenditures in the 2012 Supreme Court race may never be 
determined,217 the scope of that activity set the stage for the 
2014 judicial campaigns. 
IV. A JUDICIAL ELECTION IN THE AFTERMATH 
OF CITIZENS UNITED: PARTISANSHIP, OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS, 
AND DARK MONEY 
A. The Setting 
Weeks after newly appointed Justice Mike Wheat took the 
bench in January 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued 
Citizens United. The case concerned federal elections, but also 
would affect the states in general, Montana in particular, and 
especially the Montana Supreme Court. Due in large part to its 
history of corporate corruption, including corruption of 
judges,218 Montana led twenty-six states in an amicus brief 
urging the Supreme Court not to reach the regulation of 
corporate electioneering in the states.219 The states drew on the 
recent case of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, in which 
the Court held that “significant and disproportionate” campaign 
 
 215. Mike Dennison, Montana Supreme Court Candidate Disavows Negative Ads, 
Missoulian, Oct. 30, 2012, available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/ 
montana-supreme-court-candidate-disavows-negative-ads/article_079c224-22f2-11e2-afd8 
-0019bb2963f4.html; MGN 990, supra note 213. 
 216. Dennison, supra note 215. 
 217. Several campaign practice complaints against the Montana Growth Network remain 
pending before the state’s Commissioner of Political Practices. See Montana Commissioner 
of Political Practices, Docket of Formal Complaints, Driscoll v Montana Growth Network 
COPP-2013-CFP-0011, http://politicalpractices.mt.gov/content/2recentdecisions/Driscollv 
MTGrowthNetworkComplaint; Van Hyning v Montana Growth Network COPP-2013-CFP 
-0005, http://politicalpractices.mt.gov/content/2recentdecisions/VanHyningvMTGrowthNet  
workComplaint; Hamlett v Montana Growth Network, Inc. COPP-2012-CFP-0053, http:/ 
/political practices.mt.gov/content/2recentdecisions/HamlettvMTGrowthNetworkIncCompl 
aint (all accessed Sept. 10, 2015; copies on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and 
Process). 
 218. See supra Section II(B). 
 219. See generally Brief for the States of Montana, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, Citizens United v. F.E.C., 2009 WL 2365205. 
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funds, including independent expenditures like those at issue in 
Citizens United, amounted to a violation of due process.220 “In 
the majority of states with judicial elections at some level, 
corporate-electioneering laws help ensure that such situations 
remain ‘extraordinary’ acts of a single individual,” the states 
argued, “rather than business as usual.”221  
In holding that contribution limits in the federal election 
law violated the First Amendment, the Citizens United Court did 
not address judicial elections. Instead, in a crucial passage 
narrowing the definition of corruption, it arguably relied on a 
principle that was inapplicable to judicial elections: “It is in the 
nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, 
by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who 
support those policies.”222 In other words, “[t]he fact that 
speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials 
does not mean that these officials are corrupt.”223 And yet, as 
Professor Larry Howell observes, “if the elected officials in 
question are judges, it means exactly that.”224 Justice Stevens 
noted in dissent that “[a]t a time when concerns about the 
conduct of judicial elections have reached a fever pitch, . . . the 
Court today unleashes the floodgates of corporate and union 
general treasury spending in these races.”225 
The states accepted Citizens United, including its 
consequences for judicial elections, except for Montana. The 
state chose to defend its prohibition on corporate electioneering, 
which dated back to the popularly enacted 1912 Corrupt 
 
 220. Id. at *15–*16 (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 
(2009)). 
 221. Id. at *16 (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 887); see also Brief of Amici Curiae 
Justice at Stake et al., Citizens United v. F.E.C., 2009 WL 2365225 at *2 (arguing that 
“[e]liminating states’ longstanding ability to regulate corporate influence on judicial 
elections will cripple these essential reform efforts [aimed at “shoring up the public’s 
confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected judges”] and exacerbate the 
recent explosion of special interest pressure on the courts”). 
 222. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (quoting McConnell v. F.E.C., 540 U.S. 93, 297 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Howell, supra note 21, at 59. 
 225. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 460 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (recognizing in addition that 
“[t]he majority of the States select their judges through popular elections”). 
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Practices Act.226 A secretive organization called Western 
Tradition Partnership led a challenge to the law.227 The 
plaintiffs’ activities focused on the legislature, and they did not 
openly seek to spend corporate funds in judicial campaigns.228 
Yet the consequences for electing judges were clear. 
Ironically, perhaps, it took an elected court to comprehend 
the implications of Citizens United for state judiciaries. On 
December 30, 2011, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the 
state law in Western Tradition, distinguishing Citizens United: 
“Clearly Montana has unique and compelling interests to protect 
through preservation of this statute.”229 Among those 
distinguishing interests the court counted “corporate influence, 
sparse population, dependence upon agriculture and extractive 
resource development, location as a transportation corridor, and 
low campaign costs,” which combine to “make Montana 
especially vulnerable to continued efforts of corporate control to 
the detriment of democracy and the republican form of 
government.”230  
The Court also addressed judicial elections in detail. It 
recalled Heinze’s corrupt judges in Butte.231 It cited polls 
showing that three out of four Americans “believe that campaign 
contributions affect judicial decisions in states where judges are 
elected.”232 It even quoted Mark Twain’s quip about Copper 
King William Clark, who “is said to have bought legislatures 
and judges as other men buy food and raiment. By his example 
he has so excused and so sweetened corruption that in Montana 
 
 226. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(1) (2010) (“A corporation may not make a 
contribution or an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that 
supports or opposes a candidate or a political party.”); see also 1913 MONT. LAWS 604 
(prohibiting certain business corporations from “pay[ing] or contribut[ing] in order to aid, 
promote or prevent the nomination or election of any person”); Wiltse, supra note 21. 
 227. W. Tradition P’ship., Inc. v. Atty. Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 7 (Mont. 2011) (confirming 
that the organization’s stated purpose is “to solicit and anonymously spend the funds of 
other corporations, individuals and entities to influence the outcome of Montana elec-
tions”), cert. granted, judgment rev’d sub nom. Am. Tradition P’ship., Inc. v. Bullock, ___ 
U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012). 
 228. Id. at 6–7. 
 229. Id. at 11. 
 230. Western Tradition, 271 P.3d at 11. 
 231. Id. at 8. 
 232. Id. at 10 (citing JUSTICE AT STAKE, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
2000–2009 (Charles Hall ed., 2010)). 
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it no longer has an offensive smell.”233 Thus, the Court 
concluded, the state’s preservation of clean judicial elections 
and an independent judiciary are compelling interests: “[T]he 
free speech rights of the corporations are no more important than 
the due process rights of litigants in Montana courts to a fair and 
independent judiciary, and both are constitutionally 
protected.”234 It found support for this defense of an 
independent, fair, and impartial judiciary in Caperton, noting the 
United States Supreme Court’s acknowledgement there that 
“[j]udicial integrity is, in consequence, a state interest of the 
highest order.”235 
Sounding a broader theme of the state’s vulnerability due to 
its relatively low-cost elections and high-value resources, the 
Court also noted that “the total expenditure for media 
advertising was about $60,000” in the last race for chief justice, 
compared to corporations’ capacity to spend millions.236 Finally, 
the court turned to former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s then-
recent statement that a “crisis of confidence in the impartiality of 
the judiciary is real and growing,” in large part because of “the 
extraordinary spending power of ‘super spender groups,’ which 
are mostly corporate funded.”237  
Even the two dissenting justices only reluctantly conceded 
that Citizens United was controlling. Justice Beth Baker sought a 
saving construction of the Montana law “to preserve what 
remains of its constitutionality and to further the legislature’s 
underlying intent to prevent corruption.”238 Justice James C. 
Nelson, noting that he “never had to write a more frustrating 
dissent,” expressed his disapproval of Citizens United at length 
while nonetheless acknowledging “the applicability of a 
controlling precedent with which I profoundly disagree.”239 
Justice Nelson doubted that “the Supreme Court will allow a 
state to single out corporations as a group and prohibit them 
 
 233. Id. at 11 (quoting MARK TWAIN, MARK TWAIN IN ERUPTION 72 (1940)). 
 234. Id. at 12. 
 235. Id. (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. 
White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring))). 
 236. Id. at 13. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 14 (Baker, J., dissenting). 
 239. Id. at 18 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
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from speaking in judicial elections,” even as he noted that he 
“share[d] some of the . . . concerns”240 raised by the Western 
Tradition majority. 
The nation took notice of the Montana Supreme Court’s 
ruling.241 The Supreme Court also took notice, staying the state 
court decision pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.242 In 
an unusual statement concurring in the stay, Justice Ginsburg, 
joined by Justice Breyer, sounded agreement with the Montana 
court that “Montana’s experience, and experience elsewhere,” 
warranted reconsideration of Citizens United.243 Less than six 
months later, however, the Supreme Court issued an 
extraordinary summary reversal of the Montana court’s 
decision.244 With a curt citation to the Supremacy Clause the 
Court held that “[t]here can be no serious doubt” that “the 
holding of Citizens United applies to the Montana state law.”245 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan, voted to deny the petition, asserting that “this Court’s 
legal conclusion should not bar the Montana Supreme Court’s 
finding, made on the record before it, that independent 
expenditures by corporations did in fact lead to corruption or the 
appearance of corruption in Montana.”246  
As in Citizens United, the Supreme Court’s one-paragraph 
opinion in American Tradition did not address judicial elections 
even though the State of Montana and several amici, like the 
 
 240. Id. at 30 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
 241. See, e.g., George F. Will, Montana Attempts to Buck the Supreme Court on Citizens 
United, Wash. Post, May 30, 2012, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions 
/montana-attempts-to-buck-the-supreme-court-on-citizens-united/2012/05/30/gJQA4DCi2U 
U_story.html; Editorial, Montana Takes on Citizens United, N.Y. Times Jan. 23, 2012, at 
A26; Jess Bravin, Montana Tests Supreme Court Political Spending Ruling, Wall St. J., 
Jan. 4, 2012, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702043681045771 
39100369896494. 
 242. See Order in Pending Case, Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, No. 11A762 (Feb. 17, 
2012). 
 243. Id. (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring in issuance of stay). 
 244. American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) 
(per curiam); see also Anthony Johnstone, The State of the Republican Form of 
Government in Montana, 74 MONT. L. REV. 5, 14 (2013) (“The decision appears to be the 
first time in decades that a divided Court summarily reversed a state court to invalidate a 
state law on constitutional grounds.”). 
 245. Id. at 2491. 
 246. Id. (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., voting to deny certiorari). 
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Montana Supreme Court itself, highlighted the consequences of 
unlimited corporate and union campaign expenditures for the 
selection of judges and justices in most states.247 Judicial 
elections, Montana argued, were “wholly unexamined in 
Citizens United,” and “[n]ot even Petitioners claim a right to 
influence judicial campaigns through corporate expenditures, yet 
their arguments sweep broadly enough to undermine the 
integrity of the judicial system as much as the political 
system.”248 Eight of the eleven then-living retired justices of the 
Montana Supreme Court argued that “[e]normous special 
interest expenditures in state judicial elections are threatening 
one of the Constitution’s most central guarantees—the right to 
due process and a fair trial.”249 
Beyond Montana, constitutional scholars noted that “[i]t is 
difficult to imagine that the Court intended to foreclose 
evaluation of whether judicial elections present compelling 
government interests in a case that did not involve judicial 
elections.”250 Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia 
argued that state judges, unlike the presidential and 
congressional candidates who were the subject of the campaigns 
at issue in Citizens United, “are not ‘representatives’ with 
offices open to the public, and outside influence by major 
campaign spenders is not recognized as a legitimate factor in 
judicial decision-making.”251 The Court did not engage these 
arguments about the implications of Citizens United for judicial 
elections, but instead noted generally that “Montana’s arguments 
in support of the judgment below either were already rejected in 
Citizens United, or fail to meaningfully distinguish that case.”252  
 
 247. See generally Br. in Opp. of Montana, Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 
2490 (2012), 2012 WL 1853622 [hereinafter Montana Brief]; Amicus Br. of Retired 
Justices of the Mont. Sup. Ct. and Justice at Stake in Support of Resps., Am. Tradition 
P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012), 2012 WL 1829056 [hereinafter Montana 
Justices’ Brief]. 
 248. Montana Brief, supra note 247, at 25–26. 
 249. Montana Justices’ Brief, supra note 247, at 3. 
 250. Amicus Br. of Walter Dellinger and James Sample in Support of Resps. at 8, Am. 
Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012), 2012 WL 1863412. 
 251. Amicus Br. of New York, et al. in Support of Resps. at 17, Am. Tradition P’ship v. 
Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012), 2012 WL 1853624. 
 252. American Tradition, 132 S. Ct. at 2491. 
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American Tradition blazed a trail for other challenges 
following the reasoning of Citizens United.253 Having learned 
from the Montana Supreme Court a lesson about challenging 
election laws before state judges with first-hand experience of 
elections, litigants turned to the more favorable forum of 
appointed judges in the federal courts. One of the first laws to 
fall after the 1912 Corrupt Practices Act was Montana’s 1935 
non-partisan judicial election law, which made it unlawful for a 
political party to “endorse, contribute to, or make an expenditure 
to support or oppose a judicial candidate.” 254 In a challenge 
brought by a county Republican Committee, the Ninth Circuit 
preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the law.255 Relying on 
Citizens United, the court applied strict scrutiny to the speaker-
based restriction,256 and held that the law was likely to fail the 
narrow-tailoring requirement. Its ban on partisan endorsements 
was overbroad because 
[i]f Montana were concerned that party endorsements 
might undermine elected judges’ independence, Montana 
could appoint its judges, with a bipartisan and expert panel 
making nominations—a less restrictive alternative currently 
practiced by several states.257 
The partisan-endorsement ban also was under-inclusive because 
“it forbids judicial endorsements by political parties but not by 
other associations, individuals, corporations, special interest 
groups, and the like.”258 The court concluded that “Montana 
must be enjoined forthwith from enforcing [the statute] or 
otherwise interfering with a political party’s right to endorse 
 
 253. See Johnstone, supra note 244, at 11–12 (discussing challenges to state election 
laws following American Tradition); see also Cox v. McLean, 49 F. Supp. 3d 765, 768 (D. 
Mont. 2014) (preliminarily enjoining state law prohibiting complainant’s publication of his 
complaint to the Judicial Standards Commission). Most recently, and with significant 
consequences for judicial elections—among others—in Montana, the Ninth Circuit 
remanded a challenge to the state’s contribution limits for consideration of whether they 
meet the narrower quid pro quo corruption interest identified in Citizens United. See Lair v. 
Bullock, 798 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2015) (amending and superseding opinion first reported at 
787 F.3d 989). 
 254. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-231. 
 255. Sanders Cnty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bullock, 698 F. 3d 741 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 256. Id. at 745–46. 
 257. Id. at 746. 
 258. Id. at 747. 
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judicial candidates and to expend monies to publicize such 
endorsements.”259 Thus, Montana’s judicial elections not only 
had to be political, they had to be partisan too. 
Judge Mary Schroeder dissented from what she noted was 
the first case “to hold that even though a state has chosen a non-
partisan judicial selection process, political parties have a right 
to endorse candidates.”260 The result, she wrote, was that 
“parties can work to secure judges’ commitments to the parties’ 
agendas in contravention of the non-partisan goal the state has 
chosen for its selection process.”261 Partisan influence, Judge 
Schroeder explained, is “particularly pernicious because parties 
serve as ‘natural bundling agents that coordinate sprawling 
political coalitions across all types of policy domains and 
venues,’”262 and their power to make unlimited independent 
expenditures for or against judicial candidates under Citizens 
United “threatens to further erode state judges’ ability to act 
independently and impartially.”263 In early 2014, the Supreme 
Court denied Montana’s petition for certiorari,264 declining 
another opportunity to address judicial elections after Citizens 
United. Like the Supreme Court’s breach of the 100-year-old 
Corrupt Practices Act, this decision would lead within a matter 
of months to a flood of new money into Montana elections. 
B. The Candidates and Issues 
The 2014 campaign of Mike Wheat and Lawrence 
VanDyke produced a contest between two lawyers who were 
born elsewhere but quickly moved to southwestern Montana. 
There the similarities ended. Wheat returned home after service 
 
 259. Id. at 749. 
 260. Id. (Schroeder, J., dissenting). 
 261. Id. (Schroeder, J., dissenting). 
 262. Id. at 750 (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (quoting Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. 
Sheperd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions 
and Judicial Decisionmaking, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 107 (2011)). 
 263. Id. at 751 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit later clarified that its 
decision invalidated the prohibition on party endorsements and independent expenditures, 
but not the prohibition on party contributions to candidates. See Sanders Cnty. Republican 
Cent. Comm. v. Fox, 717 F. 3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 264. Fox v. Sanders Cnty. Republican Cent. Comm., ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1345 
(2014) (denying certiorari). 
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as a marine in Vietnam for law school at the University of 
Montana and a short stint as a state prosecutor. VanDyke left 
Montana for Harvard Law School and a clerkship on the D.C. 
Circuit. Wheat had been a plaintiff’s attorney in Montana trial 
courts for three decades. VanDyke was in his first decade of 
practice, having started as an appellate attorney at a national 
firm. Wheat eventually entered politics as an elected Democratic 
state senator and later lost a campaign for state attorney general. 
VanDyke never served in elective office, but was attracted to the 
high-profile legal docket of the Republican Texas Attorney 
General’s office before landing an appointed position under the 
newly elected Republican Montana Attorney General. These 
biographical differences would become the foundation of the 
core political differences in the campaign. 
1. Mike Wheat 
Mike Wheat was born in Spokane, Washington in 1947, 
and moved to Montana in 1948.265 He graduated from the 
University of Montana School of Law, after which he served as 
a deputy county attorney in Butte-Silver Bow County, Montana, 
for three years.266 For nearly three decades he practiced 
“plaintiff-oriented and appellate litigation, with an emphasis on 
personal injury, product liability and insurance-related claims,” 
in a firm he founded with a law-school classmate in Bozeman, 
Montana.267 From 2003 to 2007 he served one four-year term in 
the Montana Senate as a Democrat, chairing the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in 2005.268 In 2008 he ran unsuccessfully in the 
Democratic primary for state attorney general.269 Wheat was one 
of eleven applicants to fill the associate justice seat opened by 
 
 265. Charles S. Johnson, Bozeman’s Mike Wheat Appointed to Montana’s Supreme 
Court, Missoulian, Dec. 23, 2009, available at http://missoulian.com/news/local/bozeman-
s-mike-wheat-appointed-to-montana-supreme-court/article_6464ff9a-efea-11de-95a0-001c 
c4c03286.html. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Charles S. Johnson, Montana Supreme Court Race; Wheat Touts Years of 
Experience, Missoulian, Oct. 19, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-
regional/montana-supreme-court-race-wheat-touts-years-of-experience/article_8a182a04-58 
14-11e4-82be-b7c7a1293861.html. 
 269. Johnson, supra note 265. 
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the retirement of Justice John Warner, and one of three finalists 
to emerge as a nominee from the state Judicial Nomination 
Commission process.270 Governor Brian Schweitzer, a 
Democrat, appointed Wheat to fill the remainder of Justice 
Warner’s eight-year term ending in 2014, subject to an initial 
election in 2010.271 In a 2010 uncontested retention election, 
voters retained Justice Wheat with seventy-eight percent of the 
vote. 272  
In his 2014 campaign for a new term, Wheat ran on “four 
decades of legal and public service experience,” as well as his 
time on the Montana Supreme Court.273 He argued that “the 
rights afforded to us by the Constitution of Montana deserve a 
strong and independent guardian,” and focused specifically on 
his defense of the distinctive state constitutional right to “a clean 
and healthful environment” as well as public access to land and 
water.274 As the campaign progressed, Wheat emphasized what 
he called a “depth of professional and personal experience in life 
that I think helps me develop what I call judicial common sense 
and just understanding of what’s going on in the case,” in 
implicit contrast to an opponent who was twenty-five years 
younger.275 In response to criticisms of his decisions by the U.S. 
 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. Justice Wheat became the second former legislator on the court, joining Justice 
Jim Rice, who served three terms as a Republican state representative before his 
appointment and subsequent election. Jennifer McKee, Lawyer, Ex-Legislator Sworn in as 
Justice, Billings Gazette, Jan. 5, 2010, available at http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-
and-regional/montana/lawyer-ex-legislator-sworn-in-as-justice/article_902b9e3a-fa86-11de 
-9e48-001cc4c03286.html. Chief Justice Mike McGrath was previously elected as a 
Democrat for state attorney general, and Justice James C. Nelson was previously elected as 
a Democrat for county attorney (though Nelson was appointed to the court by Republican 
Governor Marc Racicot). Id.; see also Anthony Johnstone, The Hercules of Helena: Justice 
James C. Nelson and the Jurisprudence of Principle, 75 MONT. L. REV. 199, 201 (2014). 
 272. MONTANA SECRETARY OF STATE, 2010 STATEWIDE GENERAL ELECTION 
CANVASS 6-1, available at http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/Archives/2010s/2010/2010_General 
_Election_Official_Statewide_Canvass.pdf (accessed Sept. 18, 2015; copy on file with 
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 273. See Mike Wheat for Justice, http://www.wheatforjustice.com/, archived at https:// 
web.archive.org/web/20141013014020/http://www.wheatforjustice.com/ (accessed Sept. 18, 
2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 274. Id.; see also MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1(1) (“The state and each person shall 
maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future 
generations.”). 
 275. Johnson, supra note 268. 
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Chamber of Commerce, Wheat cited an eighty-five percent 
approval level in the court’s anonymous biennial survey of 
lawyers.276 “The chamber is more of a political organization,” 
Wheat argued, suggesting that its policy views make it better 
suited to lobbying the legislature.277 In general, Wheat rejected 
any complaints that he might bring a particular agenda to the 
court, noting that the justices act collectively and mostly 
unanimously.278 Interestingly, he also criticized Citizens United 
and echoed traditional concerns about “outside influences” in 
judicial races, explaining that “[w]e Montanans have an 
independent attitude and we don’t want outside corporations or 
special interest group[s] telling us how to run our affairs.”279 
Wheat received endorsements from major newspapers,280 as well 
as from the public-employee and teachers union MEA-AFT and 
the environmental advocacy group Montana Conservation 
Voters.281 
 
 276. Id.; see also U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2012 STATE 
LIABILITY SYSTEMS SURVEY: LAWSUIT CLIMATE 7 (2012) (ranking Montana forty-fifth 
among states for their “legal climate”), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform 
.com/uploads/sites/1/Lawsuit_Climate_Report_2012.pdf; MONTANA SUPREME COURT, 
MONTANA SUPREME COURT PERFORMANCE MEASURES, 2014 Bench and Bar Survey 2 
(2014) (showing that, averaged across ten performance measures, eighty-five percent of 
404 respondent judges, law faculty, and attorneys agreed that the court performed well), 
available at http://courts.mt.gov/portals/113/supreme/measures/2014/bar-survey14.pdf. 
 277. Johnson, supra note 268. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Wheat, VanDyke Compete for Supreme Court Post, Great Falls Tribune, Oct. 11, 
2014, available at http://www.greatfallstribune.com/story/news/2014/10/12/wheat-vandyke 
-compete-supreme-court-post/17068781/. 
 280. Gazette Opinion: Let’s Keep Rice, Wheat on Supreme Court, Billings Gazette, Oct. 
7, 2014, available at http://billingsgazette.com/news/opinion/editorial/gazette-opinion/ 
gazette-opinion-let-s-keep-rice-wheat-on-supreme-court/article_f38ff427-a3d1-567f-8591- 
f52f00e67487.html (“The Montana Supreme Court must remain a venue where a former 
GOP lawmaker and a former Democratic lawmaker can work together, put aside personal 
biases and make fair, just decisions for the people of Montana. Voters will get that result if 
they return Rice and Wheat to the court.”); Editorial: Wheat, Rice Deserve Support for 
Montana’s Supreme Court, Bozeman Daily Chronicle, Oct. 2, 2014, available at http:/ 
/www.bozemandailychronicle.com/opinions/editorials/editorial-wheat-rice-deserve-support 
- for - montana - s -supreme - court / article _ 8 9 3 9 c 2 1 6 - 4 a 4 3 - 1 1 e 4 - 9 4 7 e - 6 b 1 0 0 3 c 5 c 8 8 e . h t m l 
(“Wheat and Rice have both served with distinction. And they bring balance to the high 
court. Both were appointed to fill the terms of retiring justices—Rice by Republican Gov. 
Judy Martz, Wheat by Democratic Gov. Brian Schweitzer.”). 
 281. See Election 2014: Who Are the Recommended Candidates? MEA-AFT Public 
Schools Public Service (Oct. 2014), http://www.mea-mft.org/Articles/election_2014_who_ 
are_the_recommended_candidates.aspx; 2014 MCV Endorsed Candidates, MONTANA 
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2. Lawrence Van Dyke 
Lawrence VanDyke was born in Midland, Texas, in 1972 
and moved to Montana in 1973.282 He graduated from Harvard 
Law School in 2005, after which he clerked for Judge Janice 
Rogers Brown of the D.C. Circuit, and then spent five years 
practicing business litigation and working on pro bono cases for 
groups supporting civil and religious liberty causes with the 
national law firm Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher in Washington, 
D.C., and Texas.283 In 2012, VanDyke became an assistant 
solicitor general in the office of Republican Texas Attorney 
General Greg Abbott—an office noted for a leading role in 
constitutional challenges and defenses consistent with the state’s 
conservative politics, and for developing alumni, including U.S. 
Senator Ted Cruz, who are influential in Republican politics.284 
Newly elected Republican Montana Attorney General Tim Fox 
tapped VanDyke in 2013 to serve as solicitor general in his 
administration. Van Dyke left the post after eighteen months, 
“saying he had disagreements with co-workers over his 
approach to the job.”285 
 
CONSERVATION VOTERS (n.d.), http://mtvoters.org/node/2161 (both accessed Sept. 18, 
2015; copies on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 282. Charles S. Johnson, VanDyke Cites Experience, Criticizes Wheat as Result-
Oriented, Missoulian, Oct. 9, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-
regional/vandyke-cites-experience-criticizes-wheat-as-result-oriented/article_a85a5b9c-501 
1f-11e4-ad31-c3d720ff006c.html. 
 283. Mike Dennison, Montana Supreme Court Candidate VanDyke Says Appeals Are 
Focus, Missoulian, Oct. 30, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-
regional/montana-supreme-court-candidate-vandyke-says-appeals-are-focus/article_39b9c6 
40-5854-5fed-8158-060ae2f771bd.html. 
 284. Johnson, supra note 282; see also, e.g., Alex Wilts, Ted Cruz Longest-Serving 
Solicitor General of Texas, Jerry Falwell Said, Austin-American Statesman: PolitiFact 
Texas (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.politifact.com/texas/statements/2015/mar/25/jerry-
falwell/ted-cruz-longest-serving-solicitor-general-texas-j/ (indicating that Ted Cruz was 
solicitor general in Texas for more than five years) (accessed Sept. 21, 2015; copy on file 
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 285. Dennison, supra note 283. One of VanDyke’s former colleagues told a reporter that 
“I just don’t think he has the maturity or the work ethic to aspire to this position.” Matt Volz, 
Colleague Questions Candidate’s Skills for Montana Supreme Court, A.P., Oct. 25, 2014, 
available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/colleague-questions-candidate-s- 
skills-for-montana-supreme-court/article_6cdf44c8-1b41-5390-a83d-604622ecd1ee.html. 
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VanDyke’s campaign emphasized his experience in 
appellate and constitutional litigation.286 His campaign slogan 
was “Following the Law, Not the Politics,” and his campaign 
materials highlighted Wheat’s partisan political background 
while de-emphasizing the partisan alignments in his own 
career.287 VanDyke reportedly declined to answer “whether he’s 
a partisan conservative warrior,” and instead explained that 
“[j]ob one for judges is to put that tendency [to let personal 
biases influence decisions] aside and not apply your own 
preferences.”288 He said that he decided to run because “working 
as the state’s top appeals and constitutional lawyer, I came to the 
conclusion that my opponent Mike Wheat has failed to live up to 
the essential requirement of complete neutrality.”289 “My 
problem with Mike Wheat is not that he’s a liberal Democrat,” 
VanDyke told a reporter, “[m]y problem is he judges like a 
liberal Democrat”290 In interviews, he repeatedly cited the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce report and criticized what he called the 
court’s unpredictability in business cases.291 VanDyke received 
endorsements from the Montana Chamber of Commerce, the 
Montana Association of Realtors, Montana Contractors 
Association, the Montana Farm Bureau Federation, and the 
National Rifle Association.292 
 
 286. Johnson, supra note 282 
 287. vandykeforjustice.com, Van Dyke for Justice (n.d.), archived at https://web.archive 
.org/web/20141017104149/http://vandykeforjustice.com/view/compare/ (accessed Sept. 21, 
2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 288. Dennison, supra note 283; Johnson, supra note 282. 
 289. Great Falls Tribune, supra note 279. 
 290. Mike Dennison, Wheat’s Record under Attack: What’s Really in the Record? 
DailyInterLake.com (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.dailyinterlake.com/news/local_elections/ 
wheat-s-record-under-attack-what-s-actually-in-the/article_a9f59eac-6155-11e4-98ad-3b38 
e855072b.html (indicating as well that Van Dyke thought the most significant issue in the 
race was how “activist or agenda-driven judging undermines our entire system of 
government”) (accessed Sept. 21, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and 
Process). 
 291. Johnson, supra note 282; Dennison, supra note 283. 
 292. Johnson, supra note 282 (mentioning the Chamber of Commerce, Realtors, 
Contractors, and Farm Bureau endorsements); Debating Who Won, Plus NRA Likes 
VanDyke, Great Falls Tribune, Sept. 30, 2014, available at http://www.greatfallstribune 
.com/story/opinion/2014/09/30/debating-won-plus-nra-likes-vandyke/16516839/ (noting 
that its endorsement of Van Dyke was the NRA’s “only endorsement of any judicial 
candidate in Montana for 2014”). 
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C. The Qualifications Challenge: Cross v. Van Dyke 
Both candidates made their experience as practicing 
lawyers a primary qualification for serving on the bench, and 
each criticized his opponent for a lack of relevant experience. 
Pointing to his own specialized appellate experience, VanDyke 
said “I don’t think it would hurt to have at least one on our court 
that focuses on appellate and constitutional issues.”293 Wheat 
responded that “it’s not the kind of job that demands a 
constitutional specialist,” given that the court faced a much 
broader docket of issues of which constitutional law is just a 
part.294 Wheat also criticized VanDyke’s lack of trial experience, 
stating that Wheat was himself the candidate who “has the kind 
of experience in the area of law that’s required for this kind of a 
position.”295 VanDyke’s response was that Wheat’s long 
experience on the plaintiffs’ side of cases made him too 
sympathetic to trial lawyers.296 Early in the campaign, these 
political issues about experience became a legal question 
because the Montana Constitution requires judges to be 
“admitted to the practice of law in Montana for at least five 
years prior to the date of appointment or election.”297 
While VanDyke was admitted to the State Bar of Montana 
in 2005, he took inactive status—a class of bar membership for 
lawyers who “are not engaged in the practice of law in 
Montana”—in 2007.298 Less than two weeks after VanDyke 
filed for office in March 2014, he was sued for lack of 
qualification under the “admitted to the practice of law in 
 
 293. Johnson, supra note 282; see also Volz, supra note 285 (“We’ve got lots of people 
with lots of trial experience on the court,” VanDyke said. “I think what we need is some-
body who actually focuses on the law and the constitution, has some expertise in that.”). 
 294. Johnson, supra note 282 (reporting that “[t]he Supreme Court Clerk’s office said 
that since January 2006, the court has had only 34 out of 6,602 cases in which a party gives 
notice to the court that a constitutional issue is at question.”) The figure reported in this 
story understates the constitutional caseload, however, because the notice requirement 
applies only to “a party who challenges the constitutionality of any act of the Montana 
legislature,” or facial challenges to laws, and does not apply to the constitutionality of 
executive actions or local laws. See MONT. R. APP. P. 27.  
 295. Dennison, supra note 283. 
 296. Dennison, supra note 290. 
 297. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 9(1). 
 298. Cross v. VanDyke, 332 P. 3d 215, 216 (Mont. 2014). 
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Montana” provision.299 The district court disqualified VanDyke, 
excluding him from the primary ballot.300 VanDyke attacked the 
suit as “brought by Mike Wheat campaign donors to eliminate 
competition by lawsuit.”301 
On appeal, Justice Wheat and Chief Justice McGrath, who 
each had contributed $200 to Wheat’s campaign, recused 
themselves.302 Considering the case without them, a divided 
Supreme Court reversed in a four-to-three vote.303 The court 
framed the issue as “whether VanDyke’s decision to take 
inactive status with the State Bar of Montana while he practiced 
law in other states disqualifies him from meeting the 
constitutional requirement of admission to the practice of law in 
Montana for five years prior to the election.”304 The majority, 
Justice Baker writing for the court, focused on the word 
“admitted” and held that bar membership—active or inactive—
satisfied that requirement.305 The court concluded that the 
 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Charles S. Johnson, Judge Orders Montana Supreme Court Candidate Removed 
from Ballot, Missoulian, Apr. 24, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/local 
/judge-orders-montana-supreme-court-candidate-removed-from-ballot/article_4ff9de60-ccc 
a-11e3-ba8b-0019bb2963f4.html. Two of the five plaintiffs, Wade Dahood and Michael 
McKeon, and one of their attorneys, Gene Jarussi, had contributed to the Wheat campaign. 
See, e.g., Contributions to Mike Wheat: 2014 Supreme Court – 2, followthemoney.org 
(n.d.), http://followthemoney.org/ (accessed Sept. 21, 2015; copy of main page on file with 
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) (click “start here,” then enter individual 
contributors’ names to find records). 
 302. Charles S. Johnson, Court to VanDyke: McGrath, Wheat Already Recused Selves, 
Billings Gazette, May 7, 2014, available at http://billingsgazette.com/news/government-
and-politics/court-to-vandyke-mcgrath-wheat-already-recused-selves/article_4847f972-4d9 
6-5a1a-943a-0e16767ae3b1.html. 
 303. See generally Tyler Stockton, Note, Cross v. VanDyke: Admitted Only Means 
Admitted, 75 MONT. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2014) (summarizing facts, background, and 
opinions, and analyzing reasoning) (accessed Sept. 22, 2015; copy on file with Journal of 
Appellate Practice and Process). 
 304. Cross, 332 P.3d at 215–16. 
 305. Id. The court contrasted this qualification for justices with the constitutional 
qualification for attorney general, which requires “active practice [of law] for at least five 
years before election.” Id. at 219 (noting requirement of construing state constitution “as a 
whole,” and citing both MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 3(2) (addressing qualifications for 
attorney general) and MONT. CONST. art.. VII, § 9(1) (addressing qualifications for 
justices)). 
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constitution “determines minimum eligibility” and “the voters 
decide who is qualified to serve.”306 
For the dissent, Justice Cotter focused on the word 
“practice” and concluded that VanDyke was disqualified 
because he was prohibited from “the practice of law in 
Montana” while on inactive status.307 The dissent emphasized 
the court’s power to establish the qualifications to practice law 
in Montana and the ways in which inactive status falls short of 
those qualifications; it took the position that VanDyke “cannot 
have it both ways.”308 Neither the majority nor the dissent 
adopted the plaintiffs’ argument that the delegates to the 
constitutional convention of 1972 (presumably including the 
plaintiffs themselves) intended to limit supreme-court candidates 
only to those who had actually practiced in Montana for five 
years so that they would be familiar with Montana law and 
procedure.309 
D. Financing the Campaign 
With the field set, the candidates and allied advocacy 
groups began what would become a million-dollar judicial 
campaign of national note.310 Surprisingly, however, the amount 
of campaign contributions raised by both candidates was below 
 
 306. Id. at 222. 
 307. Id. at 224 (Cotter, Sandefur & McLean, JJ., dissenting). District Judge Dirk M. 
Sandefur was sitting for Chief Justice McGrath, and District Judge Edward P. McLean was 
sitting for Justice James Jeremiah Shea, who had contributed to the Wheat campaign. See, 
e.g., followthemoney.org, supra note 301. 
 308. Cross, 332 P. 3d at 224 (Cotter, Sandefur & McLean, JJ., dissenting) (explaining 
that “[t]he State Bar By-Laws clearly and plainly prohibited VanDyke from practicing law 
in Montana while on inactive status,” and that “for over five years VanDyke availed 
himself of the benefits of inactive status by paying reduced Bar dues, freeing himself from 
the payment of assessments to the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection, and avoiding the 
CLE requirements imposed on active bar members,” and concluding that, “[h]aving done 
so, he should be estopped from now asserting that he was admitted to practice law in 
Montana during those same five years”). 
 309. Id. at 221 (quoting IV CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 89, at 1119–20); see 
also id. at 222 (“The Constitutional Convention record thus supports our analysis of the 
plain language of Article VII, Section 9(1)”). 
 310. See Joe Palazollo, Judges Step Up Electioneering as Outside Money Pours into 
Races, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 2014, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/judges-step-up-
electioneering-as-outside-money-pours-into-races-1413149643; Dewan, supra note 201; 
GREYTAK, ET AL., supra note 3. 
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average for a Montana supreme court race. Due to its relatively 
low contribution limits, the Montana campaign stood out for its 
candidates’ reliance on small donors, compared with the 
dominance of large donors of $1000 or more in most other state 
judicial campaigns.311 On the other hand, Montana drew an 
exceptional amount of independent spending by national groups 
including the Republican State Leadership Committee; the 
three-quarters of campaign spending financed by outside groups 
was the second-highest share of independent expenditures in any 
state supreme court race in 2014.312 
1. Fundraising by Van Dyke 
Lawrence VanDyke raised $132,999 from about 700 
contributors. His support came from a range of interests, with 
relatively little support from the bar: twenty-two percent from 
lawyers, twelve percent from retirees, ten percent from 
agriculture, and five percent from construction, with fifteen 
percent of his contributors unidentifiable and four percent of his 
contributions self-funded.313 Thirty percent of VanDyke’s 
contributions came from outside Montana, the highest rate of 
out-of-state contributions for any supreme court candidate on 
record.314 He defended these contributions, contrasting the 
donors, including former colleagues at Gibson, Dunn & 
Crutcher, who have nothing to gain “personally” from their 
contributions, with in-state lawyers who would be appearing 
before the court.315 
 
 311. See GREYTAK, ET AL., supra note 3, at 16. 
 312. Id. at 70. 
 313. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Jessica Mayrer, Crowding the Race: Partisan Politics, PAC Money Permeate 
Supreme Court Campaign, Missoula Independent, Oct. 9, 2014, available at http:// 
missoulanews.bigskypress.com/missoula/crowding-the-race/Content?oid=2093248. In fact, 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher has appeared before the Montana Supreme Court in at least one 
major case as both counsel and a party. See Seltzer v. Morton, 154 P. 3d 561, 609, 615 
(2007) (affirming $11 million abuse-of-process judgment against Gibson, Dunn & 
Crutcher, one of its lawyers, and his client, including $9.9 million of punitive damages for 
what the court called “legal thuggery”). 
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The campaign produced ads reinforcing VanDyke’s basic 
message, “Following the Law, Not the Politics.”316 In one ad, 
the candidate noted voters often asked him, “So are you a 
Republican or a Democrat; are you a conservative or a liberal,” 
because “people . . . have gotten used to some justices acting 
like a partisan official.”317 VanDyke demurred, explaining that 
when judges base decisions on their own politics, “[t]hat is 
wrong.”318 In its final weeks, the VanDyke campaign responded 
to attack ads from what it called “dark money groups” funded by 
“the same group of wealthy trial lawyers who have poured 
buckets of money into Montana supreme court elections for 
decades,” countering those ads by asserting that “Mike Wheat 
spent over twenty years as a personal injury lawyer before 
starting his partisan political career as a Democrat.”319 The ad 
also portrayed Wheat as “anti-gun,” “anti-death penalty,” and 
“anti-resource development.”320 In his closing argument, 
VanDyke criticized “shadowy groups supported by Montana 
trial lawyers,” claiming that “ninety-four percent of money 
supporting Mike Wheat is from trial lawyers,” and that “eighty-
three percent of Mike Wheat’s lawyer donors have recently had 
cases in front of him.”321  
 
 316. See Lawrence VanDyke for Montana Supreme Court, television ad, Judges 
Shouldn’t Legislate from the Bench, YouTube (Sept. 25, 2014), available at https://youtu 
.be/Ysd6TbILnC8 (featuring a soundtrack that concludes with Van Dyke’s campaign 
slogan, “Following the Law, Not the Politics”) (accessed Sept. 22, 2015; YouTube-
generated transcript on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) ; Lawrence 
VanDyke for Montana Supreme Court, radio ad, Following the Law, Not the Politics, 
YouTube (Sept. 30, 2014), available at https://youtu.be/B_y4-5aB4E4 (accessed Sept. 22, 
2015; screen shot of YouTube page on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 
(no transcript available)). 
 317. See Lawrence VanDyke for Montana Supreme Court, television ad, Are you 
Republican or Democrat? YouTube (Sept. 8, 2014), available at https://youtu.be/MhzDHV 
MgYsw (accessed Sept. 22, 2015; YouTube-generated transcript on file with Journal of 
Appellate Practice and Process). 
 318. Id. 
 319. Lawrence VanDyke for Montana Supreme Court, television ad, Don’t Trust the 
Wheaties, YouTube (Oct. 20, 2014), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQ_ 
iG3xqygA (accessed Sept. 22, 2015; screen shot of YouTube page on file with Journal of 
Appellate Practice and Process (no transcript available)). 
 320. Id. 
 321. Lawrence VanDyke for Montana Supreme Court, television ad, Nothing Changes if 
Nothing Changes, YouTube (Oct. 24, 2014), available at https://youtu.be/IzYiJjwaFvQ. 
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2. Fundraising by Wheat 
Mike Wheat raised $161,662 from more than 900 
contributors. He relied mostly on contributions from lawyers 
(fifty-three percent), with the remainder concentrated in the 
following sectors: twelve percent from government (including 
education) and eight percent from retirees, with five percent of 
contributors unidentifiable and five percent of contributions self-
funded.322 Only three percent of Wheat’s contributions came 
from outside Montana.323 Wheat’s campaign advertising 
emphasized his legal experience as a criminal prosecutor and in 
private practice, as well as on the supreme court: “It’s important 
to elect judges that have plenty of legal experience,” he asserted, 
and “[t]he knowledge I gained over the years has helped me 
make decisions on the court.”324 As negative advertising by 
independent-expenditure groups increased late in the campaign, 
however, Wheat leveled his attacks against the messengers, 
characterizing them as “[t]hese out of state corporations . . . 
distorting the truth about me and my record.”325 Criticism of his 
unnamed opponent’s experience was secondary to naming “the 
Koch brothers and others who want to buy my seat on the 
supreme court for an inexperienced lawyer.”326 His closing 
argument was a request to “please vote to retain me, and tell 
these corporations that neither your vote nor my seat are for 
sale.”327 
3. Independent Expenditures for Wheat against Van Dyke 
As their campaign advertising suggested, the candidates 
became bit players as the election neared. Several state and 
national advocacy groups spent hundreds of thousands of dollars 
 
 322. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Brennan Center for Justice, Buying Time 2014—Montana, Advertisements, http:// 
www.brennancenter.org/analysis/buying-time-2014-montana [hereinafter Buying Time 2014 
—Montana] (scroll down to Criminal Prosecutor (Sept. 30, 2014)) (accessed Sept. 22, 
2015; copy of storyboard on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 325. Id. (scroll down to At It Again (Oct. 27, 2014)) (accessed Sept. 22, 2015; copy of 
storyboard on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
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on mailers and broadcast media, mostly attacking the 
candidates.328 The trial lawyers’ Montana Law PAC remained 
active in 2014, raising more than $161,483 in disclosed direct 
contributions of up to $10,000 each from trial lawyers and law 
firms.329 Yet it spent only $36,283 on direct campaign 
expenditures, including research, polling, and client letters 
supporting Mike Wheat. The PAC transferred most of its 
money—$125,200 of in-kind contributions in the form of 
payments for broadcast production and purchases—to a new 
political committee called Montanans for Liberty and Justice 
(MLJ). This group functioned as the new campaign arm for the 
Montana Trial Lawyers Association, sharing an office and 
officers with the association.330 It self-identified as “a coalition 
of groups representing trial lawyers, women, conservationists, 
hunters and anglers and human rights advocates.”331 Most of its 
funding came from trial lawyers, however, with smaller 
contributions from the political committee of the MEA-MFT 
public-employee and teachers union.332 In total, MLJ spent 
$394,640 on research, polling, consulting, and print and 
broadcast campaign advertising, which combined with the in-
kind contributions from Montana Law PAC, amounted to 
$519,840 of independent expenditures on behalf of Mike 
Wheat.333 The contributions to MLJ, erroneously called a “dark 
money” group by the VanDyke campaign, were disclosed in 
nearly all cases down to the individual level, including the 
contributions behind the Montana Law PAC’s transfers.334  
 
 328. GREYTAK, ET AL., supra note 3, at 53 (“Montana’s 2014 nonpartisan election saw 
the highest percentage of negative ads of any race this cycle, with 93 percent of all spots 
characterized as negative in tone.”). 
 329. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182. 
 330. Montanans for Liberty and Justice, Form C-2 Statement of Organization, Mont. 
Comm’r of Political Practices (Aug. 27, 2014 & Oct. 10, 2014).  
 331. Charles S. Johnson, Independent Groups Raise Profile of Montana Supreme Court 
Race, Missoulian, Oct. 8, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/local/independent-
groups-raise-profile-of-montana-supreme-court-race/article_c85a3734-4e8d-11e4-b633-abf 
3456caa6f.html. 
 332. Montanans for Liberty and Justice, Form C-6 Political Committee Finance Report, 
Mont. Comm’r of Political Practices (Oct. 23, 2014 & Oct. 29, 2014). 
 333. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182.  
 334. Id. 
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MLJ ran two television advertisements in the last month of 
the campaign. It spent more on television time than the other 
independent expenditure groups combined,335 including an 
estimated $153,880 on its first commercial, more than three 
times the next largest purchase.336 That ad attacked Lawrence 
VanDyke as “in the pocket of out of state special interests,” who 
worked for a “Washington D.C. lobbying firm that lobbies for 
corporate interest groups,” and as someone who has “112 out-of-
state campaign donors.” It then praised Mike Wheat as “his own 
man,” “impartial,” and “experienced.” The second MLJ 
commercial was an updated version of the first, run in the 
closing days of the election.337  
Less is known about a third outside group supporting 
Wheat. Montana Lawyers for Experienced Judges filed as an 
incidental political committee less than a month before the 
election, but did not disclose any contributions or 
expenditures.338 It shared an office and officer with a prominent 
Montana personal-injury law firm.339 Its one campaign 
advertisement, posted online, contrasts Wheat’s practice 
experience with an attack against his opponent asking, “Who is 
Lawrence VanDyke?”340 The advertisement answers by noting 
VanDyke’s relatively short career in Montana, his work as 
“[c]orporate lawyer for a California firm Gibson Dunn,” his 
 
 335. Buying Time 2014—Montana, supra note 324 (showing that the Republican State 
Leadership Committee made $65,360 of television purchases and Americans for Prosperity 
made $69,580 of television purchases). (accessed Sept. 23, 2015; copy on file with Journal 
of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 336. Id. (scroll down to Pocket (Oct. 7, 2014)) (accessed Sept. 23, 2015; copy of 
storyboard on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).  
 337. Id. (scroll down to Pocket Rev (Oct. 31, 2014) (accessed Sept. 23, 2015; copy of 
storyboard on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 338. Montana Lawyers for Experienced Judges, Form C-2 Statement of Registration, 
Mont. Comm’r of Political Practices (Oct. 9, 2014).  
 339. Compare id. with Bishop & Heenan Law Firm, About Us, available at http:// 
www.heenanlawfirm.com/about-us/ (indicating that John Heenan, who is listed as 
Treasurer in the Montana Lawyers for Experienced Judges C-2, is a partner at the law firm) 
(accessed Sept. 23, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 340. Montana Lawyers for Experienced Judges, Lawrence VanDyke, YouTube (Oct. 9, 
2014), available at https://youtu.be/RS6a8OYIxW8 (accessed Sept. 23, 2015; transcript on 
file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
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support from Gibson Dunn lawyers, and the circumstances of his 
departure from the Montana Department of Justice.341  
4. Independent Expenditures for Van Dyke against Wheat342 
a. The Republican State Leadership Committee 
 
On the other side, the campaign saw the unprecedented 
entry of a national political party in a Montana Supreme Court 
race. The Republican State Leadership Committee (RSLC), “the 
only national organization whose mission is to elect down-
ballot, state-level Republican officeholders,”343 registered the 
Republican State Leadership Committee—Judicial Fairness 
Initiative Montana PAC to support VanDyke and oppose 
Wheat.344 Unlike the trial-lawyer groups, the RSLC PAC was 
funded almost entirely by lump-sum transfers from its parent 
 
 341. Id. 
 342. One anti-Wheat committee, the anti-abortion group Women Speak Out PAC, is not 
addressed in this section. It sent mailers attacking Wheat but did not register or report its 
spending, which makes analysis of its involvement in the campaign impossible. See Mike 
Dennison, At Least $1.5M Spent on Wheat-VanDyke Race for Montana Supreme Court, 
Missoulian, Nov. 26, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/at-
least-m-spent-on-wheat-vandyke-race-for-montana/article_7de6d55b-cda1-574e-b16b-beaa 
faa719c3.html (reporting that the Women Speak Out group “did not report its spending to 
the state Political Practices Office”). 
 343. Republican State Leadership Committee, About RSLC, available at http://rslc.gop/ 
about_rslc/ (accessed Sept. 23, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and 
Process). The RSLC is a 527 organization that aggregates contributions and expenditures at 
a high level that makes it impossible to trace the funding sources for the Montana Supreme 
Court campaign expenditures. In 2014, the RSLC raised more than $38 million from 
corporations ranging from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (itself a conduit of 
contributions from other corporations) to Blue Cross/Blue Shield to Koch Industries; none 
of its major donors are Montanan. Opensecrets.org, Republican State Leadership 
Committee: Overview 2014, available at https://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtedetail 
.php?ein=050532524&cycle=2014 (accessed Sept. 23, 2015; copy on file with Journal of 
Appellate Practice and Process); Opensecrets.org, Republican State Leadership Committee: 
Contributors 2014, available at https://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527comtedetail_contribs 
.php?ein=050532524&cycle=2014. In 2014, it spent more than $10 million on 
contributions to state and local candidates, committees, and parties. Opensecrets.org, 
Republican State Leadership Committee: Expenditures 2014, available at https://www 
.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtedetail_contribs.php?ein=050532524&cycle=2014 (all accessed 
Sept. 23, 2015; copies on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 344. Republican State Leadership Committee, Form C-2 Statement of Registration 
(Amended), Mont. Comm’r of Political Practices (Oct. 1, 2014). 
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organization in Washington.345 In the Montana Supreme Court 
race, it spent a total of $430,263 on mail and broadcast 
advertising.346 
The RSLC’s first advertisement supported VanDyke as “no 
politics, no agenda, all Montana.”347 It opened with a clip of a 
report about a “convicted Anaconda rapist granted new trial,” 
then asked viewers if they were “tired of stories like these.”348 
The advertisement did not cite the case it alluded to, or identify 
Justice Wheat or any connection between Wheat and the 
“convicted Anaconda rapist.” It made general claims that 
VanDyke “is not a politician,” and “will defend our 
constitutional rights, protect our property rights, [and] enforce 
strict punishment for violent criminals.”349 The second 
advertisement was more specific, attacking the judicial record of 
“partisan politician Mike Wheat” in connection with two 
criminal cases350 in which he joined majority opinions siding 
with criminal defendants.351 The advertisement also explained 
that “Lawrence VanDyke will protect Montana families.”352  
b. Americans for Prosperity 
 
Americans for Prosperity (AFP) was even less transparent 
than the RSLC about its funding sources. It reportedly spent 
 
 345. Republican State Leadership Committee, Form C-6 Political Committee Finance 
Report, Montana Comm’r of Political Practices (Oct. 23, 2014).  
 346. Id. 
 347. Buying Time 2014—Montana, supra note 324 (scroll down to Tired of Stories (Oct. 
7, 2014)) (accessed Sept. 28, 2015; copy of storyboard on file with Journal of Appellate 
Practice and Process). 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Buying Time 2014—Montana, supra note 324 (scroll down to Critical (Oct. 7, 
2014)) (accessed Sept. 28, 2015; copy of storyboard on file with Journal of Appellate 
Practice and Process). 
 351. One of those decisions—in the case characterized in the RSLC ad as that of the 
“Anaconda rapist”—was unanimous but for the partial dissent of one justice, and the other 
decision generated only one dissent. See State v. Strong, 236 P. 3d 580 (Mont. 2010) 
(including specially concurring opinion by Nelson, J., and dissenting opinion by Rice, J.); 
State v. Sage, 235 P. 3d 1284 (Mont. 2010) (including concurring and dissenting opinion 
by McGrath, C.J., on one of two grounds for reversal). 
 352. Buying Time 2014—Montana, supra note 324 (scroll down to Critical (Oct. 7, 
2014)) (accessed Sept. 28, 2015; copy of storyboard on file with Journal of Appellate 
Practice and Process). 
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about $170,000 on television advertising alone,353 but did not 
register with or report to the Montana Commissioner of Political 
Practices.354 The likely basis for the group’s failure to disclose 
would be that it engaged only in “issue advertising,” and did so 
prior to the recent enactment of a broader “electioneering 
communications” disclosure requirement.355 Such a claim would 
be questionable given the text of the advertising and the context 
of a judicial election. AFP ran two televised advertisements 
against Mike Wheat. The first argues that “Montana deserves a 
fair and impartial supreme court,” then claims that Wheat “has a 
history of supporting extreme partisan measures.”356 It conflates 
four of Wheat’s votes as a state senator with one of his dissents 
as a justice, all over a photograph of Wheat in a judicial robe. 
The legislative votes concerned new taxes and higher fees, while 
the judicial dissent held an environmental assessment of oil and 
gas drilling permits insufficient under the Montana 
Environmental Policy Act.357 After criticizing the legislative 
votes on taxes and fees, the advertisement elides them into the 
dissenting judicial votes, characterizing them as “vot[ing] no on 
clean burning natural gas, jeopardizing Montana jobs.”358 Most 
 
 353. Dewan, supra note 201. 
 354. Commissioner of Political Practices online records contain no registration or 
reports for this expenditure by AFP. 
 355. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-101(15) (2015) (defining reportable “electioneering 
communications” as paid communication broadly distributed within 60 days of the 
initiation of voting in an election that refers to one or more clearly identified candidates in 
that election). But the AFP advertisements arguably were reportable even under the broad 
definition of campaign expenditures then in effect. See Graybill v. W. Tradition P’ship et al., 
No. COPP-2010-CFP-0016 (Oct. 21, 2010), available at http://politicalpractices.mt.gov 
/ content / 2recentdecisions / Graybill v W T P and Coalition for Energy andEnvironmentDecision 
(finding that ads characterized by the distributing organizations as “issue ads” were in fact 
intended to persuade voters to vote against specific candidates); W. Tradition P’ship v. 
Gallik, 2011 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 83, *30 (Dec. 14, 2011) (rejecting constitutional 
challenges to disclosure requirement as applied to purported “issue ads,” and noting it 
could be argued that mailers painting a candidate in a negative light are advocating for the 
defeat of the candidate under Montana law). 
 356. Buying Time 2014—Montana, supra note 324 (scroll down to Montana Deserves 
(Oct. 27, 2014)) (accessed Sept. 29, 2015; copy of storyboard on file with Journal of 
Appellate Practice and Process). 
 357. Id.; see Montana Wildlife Fed. v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation, 280 P.3d 877, 
894 (Mont. 2012) (Wheat & Morris, JJ., dissenting on procedural grounds). 
 358. Buying Time 2014—Montana, supra note 324 (scroll down to Montana Deserves 
(Oct. 27, 2014)) (accessed Sept. 29, 2015; copy of storyboard on file with Journal of 
Appellate Practice and Process). 
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implausibly, it ends with a tactic borrowed from legislative-
campaign issue ads by asking the viewer to “call Mike Wheat 
and tell him to keep his partisan politics out of our supreme 
court,” and providing the court’s phone number as if to invite ex 
parte public comment on cases before the court.359 The second 
AFP advertisement is more sophisticated in its attempt to 
compare Senator Wheat’s votes in the legislature with Justice 
Wheat’s votes on cases involving taxes, property rights, and 
energy development, but again ends with a request to call the 
court and “tell Mike Wheat to keep his extreme politics out of 
the Montana Supreme Court.”360  
c. Montanans for a Fair Judiciary 
 
Montanans for a Fair Judiciary entered the campaign late. It 
described itself as campaigning by radio and mail for “a more 
stable and business-friendly Supreme Court,” and was led by a 
former Executive Director of the Montana Republican Party.361 
It disclosed spending about $60,000 raised from a handful of 
individual contributions (more than half of the total from out-of-
state donors), with most of its money consisting of transfers 
from other PACs in the banking, construction, energy, and real-
estate sectors.362 One of its mailers, supporting VanDyke as 
“fair, honest and impartial,” landed in Wheat’s mailbox.363 
 
 359. Id. 
 360. Buying Time 2014—Montana, supra note 324 (scroll down to How Do the Votes 
Compare? (Oct. 28, 2014)) (accessed Sept. 29, 2015; copy of storyboard on file with 
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 361. Johnson, supra n. 331. 
 362. Montanans for a Fair Judiciary, Form C-2 Statement of Organization (Amended), 
Mont. Comm’r of Political Practices (Oct. 16, 2014); Montanans for a Fair Judiciary, Form 
C-6 Political Committee Finance Report, Mont. Comm’r of Political Practices (Oct. 23, 
2014) (listing $15,000 contribution from Contractors’ PAC and $5,050 of individual 
contributions from Montana); Montanans for a Fair Judiciary, Form C-6 Political 
Committee Finance Report, Mont. Comm’r of Political Practices (Nov. 24, 2014) (listing 
$30,000 total of contributions from Montana Prosperity PAC and $5,500 of individual 
contributions from Connecticut and Texas); Montana Prosperity PAC, Form C-6 Political 
Committee Finance Report, Mont. Comm’r of Political Practices (Oct. 22, 2014) (listing 
$24,500 of contributions from the Montana REALTORS PAC, Montana Gas & Oil PAC, 
Montanans for Affordable Housing PAC, Montana Bankers PAC, and the Cloud Peak 
Energy Employee PAC). 
 363. Mayrer, supra note 315. 
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5. The Close of the Campaign  
a. The Debate 
 
By the time the four candidates for two associate justice 
seats met for a candidate forum at the University of Montana on 
September 23, 2014, the advertising campaign had not yet 
reached its peak.364 Still, questions of campaign finance took 
center stage in the debate between Wheat and VanDyke. 
Wheat opened by framing his perspective on “what this 
race really is all about. . . . how our court may be under attack 
from out-of-state money, from out-of-state corporations who 
want to come into this state and influence who’s going to be on 
the court.”365 Citing a report that the national Republican Party 
intended to spend $5 million campaigning in judicial races, 
Wheat said that “[w]e have to be vigilant,” as outside money 
“starts pecking away at what we all want—fair, independent and 
impartial justices.”366 VanDyke responded that voters should 
have their “hypocrisy filter on,”367 citing independent spending 
by trial lawyers in prior judicial elections.368 He estimated that 
the trial-lawyer PAC again would spend hundreds of thousands 
of dollars in the campaign, saying that “[t]he issue is whether or 
not the trial lawyers are going to be the only ones who are 
spending money.”369 For VanDyke this was an issue of “free-
speech rights of organizations to say what they believe.”370 “If 
someone says they’d shut down speech, be skeptical,” he 
argued, “it’s a huge problem telling people what they can and 
can’t say.”371 Wheat, on the other hand, criticized Citizens 
 
 364. The author served as moderator of the candidate forum. 
 365. John S. Adams, Supreme Court Candidates Square off in Missoula, Great Falls 
Tribune, Sept. 24, 2014, available at http://www.greatfallstribune.com/story/news/local/ 
2014/09/23/supreme-court-candidates-square-missoula/16135685/. 
 366. Martin Kidston, Montana Supreme Court Candidates Debate Funding, Partisanship, 
More at UM, Missoulian, Sept. 24, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/local/ 
montana-supreme-court-candidates-debate-funding-partisanship-more-at-um/article_94637 
b28-439a-11e4-ae18-77d63833d048.html. 
 367. Id. 
 368. Adams, supra note 365. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Kidston, supra note 366. 
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United and sided with his colleague and fellow candidate Justice 
Jim Rice, who argued that “[t]he state of Montana has a 
compelling interest in protecting and preserving a fair and 
impartial judiciary.”372  
 b. The Retired Justices’ Commentary 
 
Meanwhile, seven former Montana Supreme Court justices 
published a broadside against independent expenditures in 
newspapers across the state, claiming that “our civil justice 
system is at stake,”373 and that “Citizens United empowered 
organizations with opaque, feel-good names to pour significant 
amounts of dark money into judicial elections.”374 Citing studies 
on the impact of campaign finance on judicial behavior, the 
retired justices pointed out that “the amount of expenditures and 
contributions to judicial races correlates directly with how a 
benefiting justice votes on cases.”375 Although the version in 
print did not mention any candidate, the justices clearly 
appeared to target Van Dyke’s support from outside spending. 
They began their concluding paragraph with a line that could 
have served well in a campaign advertisement: “Montanans 
deserve fair, impartial, independent and non-partisan judges and 
justices elected by Montana voters—not political hacks, bought 
and paid for by out of state dark money.”376 In a subsequent 
interview, former Justice James Nelson called it “political 
 
 372. Id. 
 373. James C. Nelson, et al., Will Montana Judges Be for Sale? Missoulian, Sept. 25, 
2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/opinion/columnists/will-montana-judges-be-
for-sale/article_2c81d34e-44c4-11e4-8b97-8b098cd6b8d6.html (containing no mention of 
Van Dyke, but indicating that the other justices sponsoring the broadside included Terry 
Trieweiler, Jim Regnier, Bill Leaphart, Bill Hunt, John Sheehy, and John Warner); see also 
Troy Carter, Ex Justices Say Candidate for Supreme Court a Corporate Puppet, Bozeman 
Chronicle, Oct. 17, 2014, available at http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/news/ 
politics/ex-justices-say-candidate-for-supreme-court-a-corporate-puppet/article_0e4fc104-5 
58d-11e4-8401-636fb002328c.html (indicating that the version of the broadside distributed 
to newspapers may have referred to Van Dyke by name).  
 374. Nelson, et al., supra note 373 (referring to “opaquely named conservative 
organizations headquartered in Washington, D.C.,” and calling out the Republican State 
Leadership Committee and Americans for Prosperity by name). 
 375. Id. (referring to studies published by two progressive-leaning research groups, the 
American Constitution Society and the Center for American Progress). 
 376. Id. 
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hypocrisy for VanDyke or his supporters to call Wheat a 
partisan judge.”377 Former Justice Terry Trieweiler praised 
Wheat and warned that “VanDyke’s election would totally shift 
the balance on the court in the direction of right-wing activism 
in total service of the corporate agenda,” and that 
“[e]vironmental laws, consumer protection laws and labor laws 
are all at risk.”378 VanDyke dismissed the criticism, claiming 
that 
all of the former justices who have criticized me in this race 
have extensive ties to the Trial Lawyers, . . . [t]he 
organization of wealthy lawyers that for decades has been 
spending huge sums of money to get justices on the court 
who will make sure they get big attorney fee awards, 
whether they deserve it or not. 379 
c. The Research Mailer 
 
Just as the campaign was winding down to its final days, a 
new and surprising voice emerged. A mysterious mailer, the 
2014 Montana General Election Voter Information Guide, 
appeared featuring the official Great Seal of the State of 
Montana, but with an attribution of “[p]aid for by researchers at 
Stanford University and Dartmouth College.”380 The mailer 
contained columns for both “Nonpartisan Supreme Court 
Justice” races, and under each contained a continuum from 
“More Liberal” to “More Conservative,” with Barack Obama 
and Mitt Romney positioned near each end, respectively.381 
Under the Wheat-VanDyke race, the mailer put Wheat slightly 
to the (more conservative) right of Obama and Vandyke slightly 
to the (more conservative) right of Romney.382 The mailer was 
sent to 102,780 registered voters in Montana, approximately 
 
 377. Carter, supra note 373. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id.  
 380. McCulloch v. Stanford and Dartmouth, No. COPP 2014-CFP-046, Decision 
Finding Sufficient Facts to Demonstrate a Violation of Montana’s Campaign Practice 
Laws, at Exhibit (May 11, 2015) (also noting—in small print—that “[t]his guide is non-
partisan and does not endorse and candidate or party” and that it “was created as part of a 
joint research project at Stanford and Dartmouth”). 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. 
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fifteen percent of the state electorate.383 After a flood of 
complaints to state election officials, the Presidents of 
Dartmouth and Stanford sent a remarkable apology “to the 
voters and citizens of Montana,” explaining that the mailer was 
not affiliated with or endorsed by the State of Montana despite 
its inclusion of the state seal.384 Instead, it was “part of an 
academic research study,” publishing to voters a comparison of 
candidates based on “public information about who had donated 
to each of the campaigns” in order “to determine whether voters 
who are given more information are more likely to vote.”385 The 
Montana Commissioner of Political Practices, however, found 
the mailer to be an independent expenditure subject to campaign 
finance disclosure, given that its purpose was to influence the 
election by affecting voter turnout.386  
d. Total Expenditures 
 
By the end of the campaign, estimates put the total 
spending for the Wheat-VanDyke race at around $1.6 million, 
making it the most expensive judicial race in state history.387 
Wheat had $780,981 spent on his side, including $162,658 in 
direct contributions, plus allied independent expenditures of 
$519,840 from the trial-lawyer-led coalition Montanans for 
Liberty and Justice, $62,200 of support from Montana Lawyers 
for Experienced Judges, and $36,283 (net of transfers) from the 
traditional trial-lawyer Montana Law PAC.388 Nearly all of these 
funds were disclosed and originated in-state, mostly from 
lawyers.389 VanDyke had approximately $794,081 spent on his 
side, including $133,818 in direct contributions, plus allied 
independent expenditures of $430,263 from the Republican 
 
 383. Id. at 7. 
 384. Id. at Exhibit. 
 385. Id.; see also Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 367 (2014) (describing the methodology of mapping ideology based on campaign-
contribution records). No results of the research study have been published, and as the 
letter of apology asked Montana voters to ignore the mailer, it seems unlikely that the study 
generated any useful data. 
 386. McCulloch, No. COPP 2014-CFP-046, at 18–19. 
 387. See Dennison, supra note 342. 
 388. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182. 
 389. Id.  
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State Leadership Committee, at least $170,000 from Americans 
for Prosperity, and about $60,000 from Montanans for a Fair 
Judiciary.390 These numbers are less precise because only the 
one-quarter of total campaign funding coming from the 
VanDyke campaign and Montanans for a Fair Judiciary 
provided full political committee disclosure of contributors; the 
contributors of the remaining amount (approximately $600,000) 
were not disclosed. Presumably it originated almost entirely 
from out-of-state sources, given the dominant national funding 
sources for the RSLC and AFP.391 After nearly $300,000 in 
candidate contributions and $1.3 million in independent 
expenditures, the money race between Wheat and VanDyke 
ended in a draw. 
E. The Election and Its Aftermath 
In the June primary only one-third of registered voters 
turned out despite the primaries in both Congress and U.S. 
Senate races.392 Then, three-quarters of primary voters cast a 
ballot in the supreme court race and Wheat won with sixty-two 
percent of the vote.393 A poll from early October showed Wheat 
leading VanDyke twenty-five percent to thirteen percent, with 
sixty-two percent undecided.394 By the time Election Day 
arrived on November 4, early voting had been ongoing for a 
month.395 Turnout was low by Montana standards—fifty-five 
percent of registered voters in a non-gubernatorial year.396 Yet 
 
 390. Id.  
 391. See notes 343 & 354, supra.  
 392. Dennison, supra note 342. 
 393. Montana Secretary of State, 2014 Statewide Primary Election Canvass, available at 
http://sos.mt.gov/elections/2014/2014-Primary-Official-Statewide-Canvass.pdf (accessed 
Oct. 5, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) Wheat swept 
every county but one, rural Powder River County, where he lost by seven votes. Id. 
 394. Mike Dennison, Montana’s Hottest Race May Be for State Supreme Court, 
Missoulian, Nov. 1, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/ 
montana-s-hottest-race-may-be-for-state-supreme-court/article_609d8176-0993-5b09-ac38 
-5df9b9bc1823.html. 
 395. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-13-205 (requiring ballots to be “available for absentee 
voting at least . . . 25 days prior to election day”). 
 396. Montana Secretary of State, Montana Voter Turnout (1920-2014), available at 
http://sos.mt.gov/elections/Voter_Turnout/index.asp (indicating that “Montana consistently 
has had one of the highest voter turnout rates in the nation” and that turnout in the 2012 
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ballot roll-off was lower than usual for judicial campaigns,397 
with eighty-eight percent of general-election voters casting a 
ballot in the Wheat-VanDyke race.398 The heavy campaigning 
had a demonstrable if minor impact on name recognition; the 
quieter—and more lopsided—race between Justice Jim Rice and 
the relative unknown David Herbert drew only eighty-one 
percent of voters who cast a ballot.399 The heavy campaigning 
had a less demonstrable impact on persuading voters to choose 
Wheat or VanDyke: Wheat won the election with fifty-nine 
percent of the vote, a move of just three points in favor of 
VanDyke since the primary.400 Wheat won thirty-five of fifty-six 
counties, with VanDyke leading only in rural counties.401  
Justice Wheat took office for the third time in five years in 
January, 2015. After his appointment in 2010, election in 2010 
for the remainder of that term, and re-election in 2014, he will 
serve a full eight-year term through December 2022. A month 
after the election, VanDyke again took office as a state solicitor 
general, this time in Nevada.402 There he will work for the 
state’s new Attorney General, Adam Laxalt, a Republican who 
won with the support of the Republican State Leadership 
Committee.403 
 
and 2010 general elections was seventy-two percent and fifty-six percent, respectively) 
(accessed Oct. 5, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 397. Judicial elections experience an average ballot “roll-off” of around  one quarter of 
voters who select candidates in the top races but do not cast votes for judicial candidates; 
higher campaign spending reduces ballot roll-off. See Melinda Gann Hall & Chris W. 
Bonneau, Mobilizing Interest: The Effects of Money on Citizen Participation in State 
Supreme Court Elections, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 457 (2008). 
 398. Montana Secretary of State, 2014 Statewide General Election Canvass, available at 
http://sos.mt.gov/elections/2014/2014-General-Official-Statewide-Canvass.pdf (accessed 
Oct. 5, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 399. Id. 
 400. Id.; see also text accompanying note 393, supra.  
 401. Id. 
 402. Associated Press, Ex-Montana Solicitor General Taking Post in Nevada, 
Missoulian, Dec. 10, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/ex-
montana-solicitor-general-taking-post-in-nevada/article_bb0d1a91-2691-5254-9af0-2d6249 
11d9a8.html. 
 403. Id. 
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V. LESSONS FROM MONTANA 
What most distinguished the Wheat–Vandyke campaign is 
the extent to which the candidates and their allies openly aired 
usually subliminal questions of campaign finance, partisanship, 
and related issues. These questions never became the exclusive 
center of attention. Conventional themes of biography, 
experience, and values pervaded the campaign. Staple 
controversies around criminal justice and natural resources also 
played their part.404 But little mention was made of several 
controversies that emerged in other states. For example, in 2012 
the Montana Supreme Court rejected by a four-to-three vote a 
state constitutional claim for same-sex civil unions on 
procedural grounds, with Justice Wheat joining a dissent that 
would have recognized spousal benefits for same-sex couples.405 
Unlike in other states, the issue went largely unnoticed in the 
judicial campaign. Similarly, in the months before the election 
two well-publicized cases involving punitive damages 
challenged the constitutionality of the state law capping those 
damages; the court heard argument in one of the challenges at 
the height of the campaign in September.406 Again, however, tort 
reform was not a major issue in the campaign, except as an 
 
 404. GREYTAK, supra note 3, at 48 (“[O]ver half the spots that aired in 2013–14 (both 
positive and negative) related to whether candidates were ‘tough on crime.’”); id. at 43 
(characterizing Wheat–VanDyke campaign as “Big Business Clashes with Environmental 
Interests”). 
 405. See Donaldson v. State, 292 P.3d 364, 374 (Mont. 2012) (indicating that Justice 
Wheat joined the dissent of Justice Cotter); see also id. at 375 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
 406. See, e.g., Vince Devlin, Polson Judge Reduces Damage Award to $73M in Crash 
that Killed Missoula Cousins, Missoulian, Sept. 23, 2014, available at http://missoulian 
.com/news/local/polson-judge-reduces-damage-award-to-m-in-crash-that/article_2162da6c- 
4285-11e4-a2cc-2b338b9819a1.html; Associated Press, Montana Supreme Court Hears 
Arguments in Jury Award Cap Case, Missoulian, Sept. 27, 2014, available at http:/ 
/missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/montana-supreme-court-hears-arguments-in-jury-
award-cap-case/article_4f9ce400-4685-11e4-86ce-9f65a9e381d5.html. The argued case, in 
which the court did not reach the punitive-damages issue, is Masters Group Int’l, Inc. v. 
Comerica Bank, 352 P.3d 1101 (Mont. 2015). The other case was settled on appeal before 
briefing. See Olsen v. Hyundai Motor Co., No. DA 14-0500, Stipulated Motion to Dismiss 
(Jan. 14, 2015), available at supremecourtdocket.mt.gov (enter case number into search 
box to see docket sheet indicating that case was dismissed on January 14, 2015 upon filing 
of a stipulated motion to dismiss) (accessed Oct. 5, 2015; copy on file with Journal of 
Appellate Practice and Process). 
JOHNSTONEPERSONAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2015 2:36 PM 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN MONTANA 117 
implication behind questions around campaign financing by trial 
lawyers and corporations. 
There is reason to believe that campaign finance is an 
especially salient political issue to Montana voters. The colorful 
history of corporate corruption in Montana at the turn of the 
twentieth century, which remained a powerful force shaping the 
1972 Constitutional Convention, remerged after Citizens United 
and American Tradition. In 2012, Montanans overwhelmingly 
approved initiative I-166, the “Prohibition on Corporate 
Contributions and Expenditures in Montana Elections Act,” by a 
margin of nearly three to one.407 The law is almost entirely 
symbolic,408 and establishes as state policy that  
each elected and appointed official in Montana . . . advance 
the philosophy that corporations are not human beings with 
constitutional rights and that each such elected and 
appointed official is charged to act to prohibit, whenever 
possible, corporations from making contributions to or 
expenditures on the campaigns of candidates or ballot 
issues.409 
The same election saw the state attorney general who litigated 
Citizens United and American Tradition, Steve Bullock, win the 
race for governor, but only after his opponent took advantage of 
an election-eve invalidation of state contribution limits to accept 
a $500,000 donation before the limits were reinstated on 
appeal.410 More recently, several Montana legislators rebuffed 
 
 407. Montana Secretary of State, 2012 Statewide General Election Canvass, available at 
http://sos.mt.gov/elections/2012/2012_General_Canvass.pdf (showing (343,549 votes for 
and 116,554 against) (accessed Oct. 5, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate 
Practice and Process). 
 408. Johnstone, supra note 244, at 22–26. 
 409. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-503. 
 410. Charles S. Johnson, Voter Reaction to Hill’s $500k Donation Could Determine 
Montana Governor’s Race, Missoulian, Oct. 20, 2012, available at http://missoulian.com/ 
news/state-and-regional/voter-reaction-to-hill-s-k-donation-could-determine-montana/article 
_467e5fb4-1b1e-11e2-ad85-001a4bcf887a.html . The money’s source turned out to be the 
Republican Governor’s Association, a national affiliate of the Republican State Leadership 
Committee that shares many of its corporate donors. See Missoulian State Bureau, 
Republican Governor’s Association Source of Hill’s $500K Donation, Missoulian, Oct. 25, 
2012, available at http://missoulian.com/news/local/republican-governors-association-source 
-of-hill-s-k-donation/article1340ba 4 8 -1ee8 -11e2 -86d6 -001a4bcf887a.html; Opensecrets.org, 
Republican Governor’s Association: Contributors 2014, available at https://www.open 
secrets.org/527s/527cmtedetail_contribs.php?ein=113655877&cycle=2014 (including some 
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efforts by Americans for Prosperity to defeat a Medicaid 
expansion in the 2015 Legislature, a backlash that brought 
several legislators to support major disclosure reforms to state 
campaign-finance law.411 This history makes Montana a 
particularly uninviting target for what Montanans might 
consider to be out-of-state dark-money groups. 
Notwithstanding its distinctive history, however, Montana 
may hold lessons for campaigns and elections in other states. 
Those lessons include some applicable specifically to judicial 
campaigns and elections. Any reforms to judicial elections must 
recognize and work around the challenges to judicial-election 
exceptionalism presented by the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment doctrine. As discussed in Part IV(A) above, these 
challenges culminate in the impact of unlimited independent and 
partisan expenditures under the rationale of Citizens United. 
That impact overwhelms the marginal protections offered by 
remaining regulations of judicial conduct in political campaigns, 
and even the ultimate backstop of due process in the most 
extreme cases. Once policymakers acknowledge the limited 
efficacy of these specific judicial election reforms given the 
primacy of independent expenditures, several ordinary 
campaign-finance reforms emerge as workable responses to the 
current role of money in judicial elections. 
A. Background: Challenges to Judicial-Election Exceptionalism 
The Supreme Court in Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White412 emphasized the principle that judicial elections are not 
politics-free contests. Its holding that “the First Amendment 
does not permit [a state] to achieve its goal by leaving the 
principle of elections in place while preventing candidates from 
discussing what the elections are about,”413 clarified that 
 
of the RSLC donors mentioned in note 343, supra) (accessed Oct. 5, 2015; copy on file 
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 411. See, e.g., Charles S. Johnson, Late-Night Soul-Searching Pushed Garner to 
Forefront of Dark Money Fight, Missoulian, Mar. 29, 2015, available at http://missoulian 
.com/news/state-and-regional/late-night-soul-searching-pushed-garner-to-forefront-of-dark/ 
article_0532cdfd-f5de-5171-813c-e98db825f449.html. 
 412. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 413. Id. at 788. 
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freedom of speech protections apply fully to judicial speech. In 
dissent from the invalidation of an “announce clause” that 
prohibited judicial candidates from expressing views on 
particular legal issues, Justice Ginsburg predicted that 
candidates would express commitments on issues “to win 
votes.”414 And Justice Stevens opined that “the judicial 
reputation for impartiality and open-mindedness is compromised 
by electioneering that emphasizes the candidate’s personal 
predilections rather than his qualifications for judicial office.”415 
It has not turned out quite that way. As the Wheat and Van Dyke 
campaigns demonstrated, judicial candidates still campaign on 
impartiality. Before electorates with any diversity of views, 
public commitments on particular issues can backfire because 
they compromise the image of a candidate’s impartiality and 
undermine candidates’ attacks on their opponents for supposed 
partiality. So judicial candidates campaign in code, as they 
always have, counting on proxies to recognize and advertise on 
the issues that win voters. Hot-button topics need not be debated 
by the candidates because they can leave arguing them to their 
allied independent expenditure groups, which face no ethical 
constraints on their characterizations of opposing candidates. 
Despite the hopes of its majority and fears of its dissenters, 
Caperton v. Massey416 presents no general solution to concerns 
about judicial-campaign finances. It recognized a due process 
problem “when a person with a personal stake in a particular 
case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing 
the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s 
election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”417 
While the rule as stated may appear to have significant 
applications in judicial campaigns, the facts of the case suggest 
that its practical scope may be limited to nearly unheard-of 
incidents involving a single contributor who funds “more than 
the total amount spent by all other [of the candidate’s] 
supporters and three times the amount spent by [the candidate’s] 
 
 414. Id. at 820 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 415. Id. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 416. 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 417. Id. at 884. 
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own committee.”418 The dissenting justices were not reassured 
by these limits. In his dissent of forty questions, Chief Justice 
Roberts asked, for example, “What about contributions to 
independent outside groups supporting a candidate?” and “What 
if the ‘disproportionately’ large expenditure is made by an 
industry association, trade union, physicians’ group, or the 
plaintiffs’ bar?”419 
The following year, Citizens United distinguished these 
questions in form: “Caperton’s holding was limited to the rule 
that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant’s political 
speech could be banned.”420 But in practical terms, Citizens 
United answered them.421 Its deregulation of independent 
expenditures, and the subsequent proliferation of networked 
“outside groups” and “industry associations” engaged in 
campaign spending, makes an anachronism of the  direct, 
disclosed, and overwhelming contributions at issue in Caperton. 
Now big donors hoping to influence the work of the courts enjoy 
a range of national and state-based conduits for campaign 
spending that are practically impossible to track for a litigant 
who might later have grounds for a recusal motion.422 
 
 418. Id. at 873. 
 419. Id. at 893, 894 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 420. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360. 
 421. See Richard Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 581, 611–15 (2011) (arguing that the distinction between Citizens United and 
Caperton in their treatment of independent expenditures is unpersuasive); but see James 
Sample, Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign Spending 
and Equality, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Survey Am. L. 727 (2011) (arguing for a distinction from 
Citizens United for judicial campaigns based on Caperton’s treatment of judicial-campaign 
expenditures as “contributions”). 
 422. The Montana Supreme Court itself has recognized the impracticality of recusal 
based on electoral consequences. In Reichert v. State ex rel. McCulloch, 278 P.3d 455 
(Mont. 2012), the court heard a constitutional challenge to a referendum that would place 
the justices in seven districts for election. Several legislators who supported the referendum 
intervened, and sought the recusal of four justices who were not currently standing for 
election but might have stood for re-election in the future because the referendum would 
have disqualified from re-election any sitting justice who did not relocate to his assigned 
district. Id. at 463. The court held that the justices were “potential” candidates whose 
reelection bids “could possibly” be hindered by the referendum, and that there was 
therefore no “actual evidence of bias, prejudice, or unethical conduct on the part of any 
justice or judge sitting” on the case. Id. at 471. If possible disqualification from re-election 
to judicial office is insufficient to trigger “actual evidence of bias” justifying recusal, it 
would seem that large campaign contributions by litigants likely will be insufficient too, at 
least if they are funneled through intermediaries into independent expenditures. 
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Recusal under Caperton is impracticable in a post-Citizens 
United regime in which particular interest groups, and even 
particular litigants, are able to aggregate and route large 
campaign expenditures through a shell game of trade 
organizations and political committees. The primitive Caperton 
tactic of direct expenditures is naive in a world of campaign-
finance conduits like Americans for Prosperity, the Republican 
State Leadership Committee, and home-grown interlocking 
super PACs like Montanans for Liberty and Justice and 
Montanans for a Fair Judiciary. If a latter-day Copper King 
wanted to elect a latter-day Judge Clancy, there would be no 
need for direct contributions or even corporate independent 
expenditures. Instead, he could run his corporation’s treasury 
funds into a trade organization like America’s Natural Gas 
Alliance, through a like-minded national committee like the 
Republican State Leadership Committee, and into a state 
affiliate like the Judicial Fairness Initiative Montana PAC. 
Similarly, though more transparently, a trial lawyer with a major 
punitive damages award on its way to the Montana Supreme 
Court might write a big check to the Montana Trial Lawyers 
Association to fund its Montana Law PAC, knowing that most 
of his funds would transfer to an affiliate like Montanans for 
Liberty and Justice. Either the industrialist or the litigator could 
hedge his bets with more direct PAC contributions to a single-
candidate super PAC, signaling his interest in the campaign to 
related committees that might then double down on the race, and 
also signaling his support to the candidate. Short of a simply 
enormous transfer of $1,000,000 straight through the 
committees and into the campaign, none of these maneuvers is 
likely to draw scrutiny under Caperton. Nor are they likely to 
satisfy ordinary recusal standards, given the nature of 
“independent” expenditures and the aggregation of any one 
donor’s contributions with those made by others.  
Just as Caperton is no match for the flood of independent 
expenditures authorized by Citizens United, the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Williams-Yulee v. State Bar of 
Florida,423 which presented a challenge to a prohibition against 
a judicial candidate’s personal solicitation of campaign 
 
 423. ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
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contributions or endorsements, seems likely to have little effect 
in the present environment.424 Consistent with the logic of 
Citizens United, the vast majority of money spent in the Wheat 
and VanDyke campaigns was in the form of independent 
expenditures that could not have been solicited by the 
candidates. As the 2014 Montana campaign demonstrated, no 
matter how a candidate raises $150,000, the campaign message 
will be delivered four times more loudly by independent 
expenditures of $600,000. In Williams-Yulee, only Justice 
Ginsburg’s concurrence, joined by Justice Breyer, addresses a 
possible distinction between campaigns for judicial office and 
Citizens United’s theory that “[i]t is in the nature of an elected 
representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary 
corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those 
policies.”425 
B. The Primacy of Independent Expenditures 
The crucible of campaign finance in Montana between 
2010 and 2014 established the primacy of independent 
expenditures in judicial campaigns. The series of cases from  
White to Caperton to Williams-Yulee might suggest significant 
shifts in the landscape arising from the Supreme Court’s 
decisions of issues specific to judicial campaigns. Montana’s 
experience suggests, however, that no development in the 
constitutional law of judicial campaigns has had as much impact 
as Citizens United and its narrowing of the corruption interest so 
 
 424. It is possible that the Court has opened a path to limit the reach of Citizens United 
in judicial elections with its recognition in Williams-Yulee that “a State has compelling 
interests in regulating judicial elections that extend beyond its interests in regulating 
political elections, because judges are not politicians.” Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1672. 
 425. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1673–74 (Ginsburg, concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (quoting McConnell v. F.E.C., 540 U.S. 
93, 297 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Perhaps this potential 
limitation of Citizens United’s reach is a development that the dissenting justices in 
Williams-Yulee anticipate by their surprising lack of reliance on Citizens United. See 
Williams-Yulee at 1682 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 
460 (2010); Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2729 
(2011); and United States v. Alvarez, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)); see also id. at 
1684 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring) and White). Justice Alito’s dissent did not cite a case. See id. at 
1685. 
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as to exclude concerns about undue influence arising from 
unlimited independent expenditures. Citizens United not only 
reached judicial elections (through American Tradition) with 
little consideration of the consequences of that extension, but it 
also played a crucial role in the invalidation of the partisan 
endorsement and expenditure ban for judicial elections in 
Sanders County Republican Central Committee.426 That broke 
the barrier between national party treasuries and state judicial 
campaigns, adding to the flood of outside money. 
In short, Citizens United preempts White because 
candidates need not worry about public campaign promises once 
private money starts lining up. Citizens United trumps Caperton 
because no form of due process or recusal practicably can sift 
out a sophisticated litigant’s independent expenditures, and—at 
least according to the reasoning of Citizens United—
independent expenditures can no longer corrupt. And Citizens 
United overwhelms Williams-Yulee because, in the judicial 
campaigns that matter most, neither candidates nor supporters 
rely on direct contributions given the ease and efficacy of 
indirect independent expenditures. 
The chart on the following page427 details the primacy of 
independent expenditures after Citizens United. The Wheat–
 
 426. 698 F. 3d 741 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 427. All data in the chart are from Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182, and are 
inflation-adjusted to 2014 dollars. The Chart excludes both uncontested races and 
noncompetitive campaigns of candidates who raised less than ten percent of the amount 
raised by the winning candidate.  
Information relevant to particular campaigns: 
An asterisk (*) denotes the winner of a particular race. 
In 2002, the Montana Law PAC reportedly spent $150,000 (nominal) toward two 
candidates, but only one race was contested; all of that amount is allocated as spent on 
behalf of candidate William Leaphart. 
In 2012, the Montana Growth Network disclosed spending $42,000 to support can-
didate Laurie McKinnon in the primary, but later reported on a tax form spending $687,720 
on public education mailings and advertising, likely in the form of campaign-related “issue 
ads” targeting judicial and legislative candidates; based on the group’s emphasis on the 
judicial campaign in the primary and a $50,000 transfer to American Tradition Partner-
ship—which targeted McKinnon’s opponent Sheehy in a mailing—half of that amount is 
allocated as spent on behalf of McKinnon. It is not known how much the Montana Growth 
Network ultimately targeted for the race between Laurie McKinnon and Ed Sheehy, but 
even a conservative estimate of the share dedicated to the judicial race pegs it as a major 
factor in the 2012 campaign. 
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VanDyke campaign was the most expensive on record only 
because of independent expenditures and related election 
spending. Indeed, the candidates themselves raised relatively 
small amounts of campaign contributions by historical standards 
for contested races. Only Justice Nelson’s defense of a seat in 
2004 came close to the 2014 campaigns. 
 
Financing of Contested Montana Judicial Campaigns: 1990-2014   
 
C. Ordinary Campaign-Finance Reforms 
for Judicial Campaigns  
Because Citizens United matters to judicial campaigns in 
the same way it matters to all political campaigns, there are 
common responses to it. These include improved campaign-
finance disclosure, especially of electioneering communications 
and conduit organizations; recalibrating contribution limits to 
draw more fundraising directly to candidate campaigns without 
significantly increasing corruption concerns; and reconsidering 
public financing for judicial campaigns. Eliminating judicial 
campaigns, a solution proposed by many frustrated with recent 
 
In 2014, the Republican State Leadership Committee reported independent 
expenditures on behalf of candidate Lawrence VanDyke, but received most of its 
contributions as an opaque transfer from its national affiliate. 
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campaign-finance developments, is a last resort that may not 
resolve the most important concerns about political influence in 
judicial selection. The trend toward increased amounts of money 
in judicial campaigns presents the challenge of undue influence, 
but also presents an opportunity to revisit the ways in which 
campaign finance law can mitigate, or at least not aggravate, that 
trend. 
1. Effective Campaign-Finance Disclosure 
Campaign-finance disclosure law should embrace Citizens 
United’s validation of electioneering communication 
disclosure.428 This empowers state law to reach campaign-
targeted advertising, like the Americans for Prosperity 
commercials attacking Wheat, that may currently evade 
disclosure by avoiding appeals to vote for or against a candidate. 
More broadly, Citizens United’s endorsement of disclosure in 
general enables states to consider more robust application of 
disclosure requirements to conduit organizations like the 
Republican State Leadership Committee’s Montana-based PAC, 
which disclosed little more than a massive contribution from its 
parent organization’s aggregation of corporate funds. Improved 
disclosure is important not because it enables recusals at the 
courthouse—though it may in extreme cases—but because it 
enables rejoinders on the campaign trail. Revealing the money 
behind a candidate raises consciousness of factions, giving 
voters an opportunity to check such special interests on the 
ballot.429 On both sides of the Wheat–VanDyke campaign, the 
candidates and even the super PACs used campaign-finance 
disclosure to make each side’s financial supporters a central 
issue in the campaign. It would have been difficult to develop a 
clearer referendum on Montana trial lawyers versus out-of-state 
corporations than those interests themselves provided in the 
2014 campaign. 
 
 428. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369 (“[W]e reject Citizens United’s contention that the 
disclosure requirements must be limited to speech that is the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy.”) 
 429. See Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 413, 443–49 (2012). 
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Another element of effective campaign-finance disclosure 
is higher disclosure thresholds. This reform could be particularly 
important in judicial campaigns, where the smart money may sit 
idle in thousands of lawyers’ and clients’ pockets for fear that a 
contribution could unconsciously or consciously affect a 
candidate’s judgment in a future case. A little of that idle 
money, aggregated across thousands of potential contributors, 
could boost the influence of constituents who know the 
candidates best and counter the impact of independent 
expenditures by outside interests. Relatively low disclosure 
thresholds—like the thirty-five dollar trigger in Montana, which 
applies regardless of the size of the constituency or donor 
base430—discourage such retail-level campaign contributions 
without significant benefits in preventing corruption. Judicial 
campaigns already start with relatively narrow donor bases that 
leave candidates dependent on a few large donors willing to 
contribute to either their campaigns or their allied PACs. In a 
million-dollar campaign, an anonymous (or reported but not 
disclosed) contribution of a hundred dollars will go unnoticed, 
but enough of them will go a long way toward countering the 
effects of outside spending.431 
2. Recalibrated Contribution Limits 
Montana has relatively low contribution limits.432 
Independent expenditures, including many made by the same 
contributors who make the maximum contribution allowed to a 
candidate campaign, render these limits less effective. First, they 
make it more difficult for a candidate to raise enough funds to 
counter attacks funded by independent expenditures. Second, 
they divert contributions away from disclosed, accountable 
candidate campaigns toward sometimes opaque, less 
accountable independent expenditure groups. In Montana a 
 
 430. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-229(2). 
 431. See Anthony Johnstone, The System of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 99 IOWA L. 
REV. BULL. 143, 159–60 (2014). 
 432. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-216 (2014); see also Lair, 798 F.3d at 748–49 
(remanding for reconsideration of whether those limits are constitutional). See generally 
Anthony Johnstone, Recalibrating Campaign Finance Law, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217 
(2014). 
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typical supreme court candidate has a base of between 500 and 
1000 contributors (a number that may increase if the law raises 
disclosure thresholds).433 In 2014, a candidate in a contested 
election could accept $320 in the primary election and another 
$320 in the general election.434 A judicial candidate can raise a 
few hundred thousand dollars assuming that many contributors 
give the maximum amount; this means that, at most, a 
candidate’s leading contributors could take credit for a fraction 
of one percent of the candidate’s fundraising total. A modest 
increase in contribution limits would be large enough to enable a 
judicial candidate to respond to the new scale of independent 
expenditures but still small enough to prevent any one donor or 
group from taking credit for the candidate’s campaign. This 
would pose few additional corruption concerns, especially 
compared to the current alternative of diverting unlimited 
contributions to single-candidate super PACs. An increased 
contribution limit can channel larger contributions back toward 
candidates and away from independent expenditures. 
3. Public Financing for Judicial Campaigns 
One of the most important ideas to come out of Montana’s 
1972 Constitutional Convention, in concept if not in law, is 
limited public financing of judicial elections. Any new proposal 
for public financing must take care not to limit expenditures435 
or penalize candidates who self-fund or benefit from 
independent expenditures.436 A proposal also must minimize the 
risk of strategic behavior by candidates looking to exploit public 
 
 433. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182. 
 434. MONT. ADMIN. R. § 44.10.338(1) (2014) (limiting contributions to $320 per 
election for supreme court candidates in 2014). 
 435. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1976) (invalidating limits for 
independent expenditures, a candidate’s expenditures from his or her own personal funds, 
and overall campaign expenditures). 
 436. See Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (invalidating so-called 
“millionaires amendment” lifting contribution limits for candidates facing self-funded 
opponents); Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, ___ U.S. ___, 
131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (invalidating matching funds for publicly financed candidates that 
were triggered by opponents’ spending and that of independent-expenditure groups). 
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financing.437 Preserving an independent judiciary, an original 
purpose of judicial elections, may justify the public expense 
necessary to finance judicial candidate campaigns. As delegates 
argued in 1972, there are significant distinctions between 
judicial campaigns and other political campaigns;438 these 
differences might draw even those opposed in general to public 
financing of elections to support it for judicial elections. 
4. Abolishing Judicial Elections 
There is a final option that would be unthinkable for other 
elective offices: abolish judicial elections. As ambitious as 
disclosure and public financing may be, this is likely the least 
realistic response to Citizens United’s impact on judicial 
elections. Voters have not surrendered their power to elect 
judges for decades.439 For some, the world after Citizens United 
demands abolition now more than ever. Consider, for example, 
former Justice James Nelson, who dissented in Western 
Tradition while decrying Citizens United. He once defended 
judicial elections as practiced in Montana, writing in 2010 that 
“[t]he elected judges and justices with whom I am familiar make 
decisions based on the facts and the law as they see it, regardless 
of whose ox is gored in the process,” and also noted that “a 
judicial election decided on the basis of one unpopular decision 
is relatively rare.”440 His own experience had been that 
“Montanans want nonpartisan judges and will not elect 
candidates who fail that threshold test,” and, he pointed out, 
“Montana, with its severe campaign-contribution restrictions, 
has not faced the sort of buy-a-judge problems that have 
 
 437. Under current Montana law, for example, candidates (or their allies) have an 
incentive to recruit a primary challenger so as to double the contribution limits. See MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 13-37-216(5) (2015) (“If there is a contested primary, then there are two 
elections to which the contribution limits apply.”). 
 438. See generally CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 89; CONVENTION 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 90. 
 439. Rhode Island was the most recent state to change from judicial elections to merit 
selection, in 1994. See, e.g., Nat’l Center for State Courts, Judicial Selection in the States: 
Rhode Island, available at http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm? 
state=RI (accessed Oct. 7, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and 
Process). 
 440. James C. Nelson, Keeping Faith with the Vision: Interpreting a Constitution for 
This and Future Generations, 71 MONT. L. REV. 299, 310 (2010). 
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poisoned elections in states where there are sky-is-the-limit 
individual and corporate contributions.”441 But as Citizens 
United impacted campaigns, including the 2014 judicial 
campaign in Montana, Nelson turned sharply against judicial 
elections. Not only does the threat of independent expenditures 
discourage qualified attorneys from running for judicial office, 
Nelson now argues, but the promise of independent expenditures 
encourages unqualified candidates to run.442 As a result, Nelson 
now argues for a constitutional amendment establishing “a 
purely merit-based system” by a selection committee of 
designated legal and civic leaders.443 Other jurists, like former 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, opposed judicial elections well 
before Citizens United,444 and she continues to oppose them 
today.445  
In light of the origins of judicial elections in arguments 
leading to the 1889 Montana Constitution, and the concerns 
about judicial appointments expressed around the 1972 Montana 
Constitution, we might be careful what we wish for. The 
“Missouri Plan” of merit selection still requires retention 
elections that, as Iowa’s experience shows, are also susceptible 
to campaigns that threaten to compromise judicial integrity.446 
Appointive systems without retention elections may free judges 
 
 441. Id. (footnote omitted) 
 442. James C. Nelson, It’s Time to Make a Change in Selecting Judges in a Post 
Citizens United World, 40 MONT. LAWYER 21, 21 (Feb. 2015) (also acknowledging that he 
had “always been a strong proponent for electing Montana’s judges and justices,” but 
announcing that he had changed his mind because “[i]t is clear from this last election cycle 
that campaigns for Montana's Supreme Court—and, potentially, other State judicial 
offices—will henceforth be characterized by huge expenditures of dark money, attack ads, 
misleading mail stuffers, and the involvement of out of state money and organizations—all 
directed to the end of influencing Montana’s elections and buying a seat or seats on the 
Court”). 
 443. Id. 
 444. See White, 536 U.S. at 792 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“If the State has a problem 
with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by continuing the 
practice of popularly electing judges.”). 
 445. See, e.g., Sandra Day O’Connor & Institute for the Advancement of the American 
Legal System, The O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan (2014) (providing for merit selection, 
gubernatorial appointments, performance evaluations, and non-partisan, no-opponent 
retention elections); Sandra Day O’Connor, Take Justice Off the Ballot, N.Y. Times, May 
22, 2010, at WK9. 
 446. See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, Retention Redux: Iowa 2012, 14 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 47 (2013) (contrasting two sets of Iowa retention elections). 
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of the burden of elective politics, but at the cost of concentrating 
those politics on the elected officials responsible for the 
selection. A critic of Citizens United—on grounds that undue 
influence is far more pervasive than the Supreme Court 
acknowledged in that decision—must also recognize that 
appointive selection concentrates that influence on the appointer. 
The federal model of executive appointment and legislative 
confirmation for life terms only raises these political stakes,447 
and would raise them even more for state judges whose general 
jurisdiction and common law powers allow them a far greater 
impact on state electorates than their federal counterparts. To 
use the hydraulics metaphor sometimes applied to campaign 
finance,448 it seems safe to say that, like water or money, 
political influence will find its way through any judicial-
selection landscape. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
State courts, no less than federal courts, pose critical 
questions of independence and accountability under the rule of 
law. There is no one right answer to those questions for all 
jurisdictions. Montana’s answer reflects a territorial suspicion of 
outside influence, a progressive-era concern about corporate 
corruption, and an extraordinarily deep deliberation among 
ordinary citizens about competing models for judicial selection 
in the formation of its 1972 constitution. The result is a hybrid 
model sharing elements of contested election, retention election, 
merit, and (with strong gubernatorial representation on the 
nominating commission) straight appointment models. After the 
invalidation of its partisan-endorsement prohibition, Montana 
now also shares some elements of a partisan-election model, for 
better or worse. 
 
 447. See, e.g., John Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal Judicial 
Appointments Process under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
1, 3 (2003) (referring to “confirmation battles over judicial nominees” and “a dramatic 
slowdown of the confirmation process for federal judges”). 
 448. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1713 (1999) (“Money, like water, will seek its own level. 
The price of apparent containment may be uncontrolled flood damage elsewhere. . . . The 
money that reform squeezes out of the formal campaign process must go somewhere.”). 
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As in other states with similar models of judicial elections, 
Montana’s model is being tested by a new normal in politics. 
More than any other recent development, Citizens United 
disrupted the traditional practice of judicial elections in 
Montana. The Montana Supreme Court itself invited the justices 
to consider the implications of that case for judicial elections in 
Western Tradition, but the United States Supreme Court 
declined. In the aftermath, corporate expenditures, super PACs, 
dark money, and even national political parties flooded 
Montana’s relatively small supreme court campaigns with 
exactly the sort of out-of-state corporate influence Montanans 
had fought against for the last 150 years. This prompted a 
vigorous public debate, in the context of the campaign between 
Mike Wheat and Lawrence VanDyke, about the Montana 
Constitution and Citizens United, the influence of trial lawyers 
and corporations, and the merits of electing judges at all. The 
campaign did not settle that debate, of course. Instead, it raised 
old questions about judicial selection in a new era of campaign 
finance. In 2014, as in 1864, 1889, 1972, and 2010, and in 
Montana as in its sister states, those questions continue to call 
for answers. 
 
 
 
